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Abstract 
Overall objective 
The overall objective of this dissertation is to identify and analyse decisions in tax cases in 
which the concept of receipts and accruals has been applied over the years. As there is no 
definition in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 as amended (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') 
as to the meaning of the terms 'received by' or 'accrued to', the other available option is to 
resort to case law as interpreted by the courts. 
L_ 
The research involves an analysis of reported cases, statutes and any research relevant to the 
topic with the hope of bringing a better understanding of the meaning of a receipt or an 
accrual, and to make appropriate recommendations. The dissertation includes the following 
chapters: 
Aims of the topic 
Introduction 
The meaning of 'accrued to' the taxpayer 
The meaning of 'received by' the taxpayer and beneficial receipt or accrual 
Non-monetary receipts and accruals including barter transactions 
Time of accrual and valuation of the accrued amount 
Conclusion 
Research question 
The question to be answered by this dissertation will be an evaluation of the phrase 'received 
by' or 'accrued to' with emphasis on the valuation of non-monetary receipts for the purpose 
of the definition of 'gross income'. 
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Hypotheses 
The point of departure is that case law has not yet resolved the issue around the meanings of 
'received by' or 'accrued to' as is evident in the judgment from People's Store's. This 
perpetuates one of the great weaknesses of the South African law of income tax, namely, its 
almost total lack of 'analytical jurisprudence'. In People's Stores an important underlying 
question was whether the concept of 'accrual' relates to timing, or whether it concerns a 




• Research within and outside the Republic of South Africa. The research is done 
through the internet and with information from the library. 
• Analysing various decisions made by South African courts. 
• Analysis of the Income Tax Act and relevant Practice and Interpretation Notes. 




Income tax is levied on a taxpayer's taxable income as defined in the Income Tax Act (the 
Act) for a particular year of assessment. First, before determining taxable income, a 
taxpayer's gross income must be established. The definition of 'gross income' in the Act 
starts as follows:1 
' "gross income" in relation to any year or period of assessment means, in the case of any person, the 
total amount... received by or accrued to or in favour of such person during that year of assessment... 
excluding receipts and accruals of a capital nature ... . ' 
The terms 'total amount', 'received by' or 'accrued to' or 'in favour of' and 'during that year 
of assessment' mean that income tax is determined and levied on an annual basis excluding, 
except for special provisions, all activities preceding and following the current year of 
assessment. 
Further a 'total amount' that has been 'received by' or 'accrued to' means that the taxpayer 
must include not only the amounts received by him but also amounts that accrued to him 
during a year of assessment. 
An amount will be included in gross income either when it accrues to or when it is received 
by the taxpayer without being taxed twice. It is an accepted general practice that the same 
amount cannot be taxed twice. When the accrual is disclosed in any tax return the practice of 
the Commissioner is to tax the accrual and not to wait for the subsequent receipt which could 
happen in a future year. 
Section 1 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 as amended 
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The terms 'accrued to', 'received by' or 'in favour of as they appear in the definition of 
'gross income' are an indication that the definition applies to both of them. 
It is submitted that, except for special provisions, if a person neither receives nor has anything 
accruing to him, there can be no amount to be included in his gross income. For example, 
notional income cannot be included in gross income because it is neither a receipt nor an 
accrual. 
There are a few exceptions when the liability for tax arises even if there is neither a receipt 
nor an accrual: 
• A gain arising on exercise, cession or release of a right to acquire shares can be subjected 
to taxation in certain circumstances under section 8A or section 8C even though the gain 
does not constitute a receipt or accrual. 
• The value of trading stock applied by the trader for his private or domestic use may be 
included in his gross income. This is neither a receipt nor an accrual. 
• A foreign exchange gain is also included in gross income in terms of section 241 of the 
Act. 
• Fringe benefits enjoyed by employees are taxed under the Seventh Schedule, some of 
which are not receipts or accruals. 
It has been stated that as a general rule, if there is neither a receipt nor an accrual there cannot 
be a liability to pay tax. But the Act does subject a person to tax on amounts that have been 
neither 'received by' or 'accrued to'. In addition, for example, section 7 of the Act, deals with 
deemed accruals. Its provisions were introduced to curb the distribution of wealth and to 
reduce tax liabilities of those taxpayers in high tax brackets. 
An accrual can also arise when a creditor for whatever reason does not recover his money, for 
example, because he cannot be traced. In ITC 16342, a taxpayer transferred the amount 
standing on credit in a creditor's account to income when it became clear that no amount 
would be payable to that creditor. The unpaid amount can be treated as an accrual in the hands 
of the taxpayer and subjected to tax.3 
2(1997)60SATC235. 
3 Silke Silke on South African Income Tax Volumel 2007 para 2.1. 
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Chapter 2 
Meaning of 'accrued to ' 
After years of debates and deliberations about the meaning of the word 'accrual', that is, as to 
whether it meant 'entitled to', or 'due and payable' it was decided in CIR v People's Stores 
(Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd4 that an amount accrued to the taxpayer when he becomes 
(unconditionally) entitled to it, but that something must be deducted from the face value of an 
accrual that is receivable in a future year of assessment. There are a number of cases that are 
analysed so as to come to a common understanding of the meaning of the terms 'accrued to' 
and 'received by'. 
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court judgment in Hersov's Estate v CIR gave an 
instructive meaning to the word 'accrued' for the purposes of the definition of'gross income'. 
The taxpayer was one of the managing directors of a company. An agreement was concluded 
between the taxpayer and the company that in the event of his death the company would pay 
21, 2% of its surplus of assets (or in current terms its net asset value) as determined at the date 
of his death. Hersov died on 15 January 1949. A large sum of money was paid to his estate in 
terms of the agreement concluded before his death. The Commissioner in the determination of 
his taxable income from July 1948 to the date of his death included the amount in his gross 
income. The representative of the late taxpayer finally appealed to the Appellate Division. 
The nature of the amount was not an issue because it was established that the amount bore the 
character of remuneration and was therefore not of a capital nature. The court held that in 
terms of the agreement no amount could be paid until after the death of the taxpayer. The 
amount paid could not have been received by or accrued to the taxpayer for his final period of 
assessment. The amount could not be included in taxpayer's gross income. The accrual was in 
favour of his estate. The court viewed that the accrual took place two months after the death 
of the taxpayer. It is evident from this decision that Centlivre CJ, who delivered the judgment, 
having referred to the Lategan and Delfos cases, that accrual could take place only when the 
amount became due and payable. 
41990 (2) SA 353 (A), 52 SATC 9. 
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Another view was adopted in Lategan v CIR.5 The issue in this case, was in addition to the 
amount received by the taxpayer, what amount accrued to him during the year of assessment 
in question. The taxpayer was a wine farmer who sold the wine he had produced. In May 1920 
the taxpayer sold wine to the value of £5 924. Of this amount £3 500 was received by the 
taxpayer before 30 June 1920 (the end of year of assessment). 
The taxpayer belonged to a wine fanners' co-operative formed to control and regulate the sale 
of wine by its members. The articles of the co-operative had a clause allowing for certain 
retention and contribution moneys to be deducted from moneys due and payable to, or 
receivable by, borrowing an accounting term, its members. The 'retention' moneys were used 
for operational expenses and the 'contribution' moneys were used partly for administration 
cost and partly for creation of reserves in which the taxpayer became entitled to receive 
shares. 
The Commissioner included the whole amount of £5 924 in the taxpayer's gross income not 
allowing a deduction for both 'retention' and 'contribution' moneys. The matter ultimately 
was brought before the Cape Town Provincial Division of the Supreme Court for a decision. 
Watermeyer J, in his judgment said the following:6 
'In my opinion the words in the Act has accrued to or in favour of any person merely mean to which he 
has become entitled. So far as a debt is concerned which is payable in the future and that in the year of 
assessment, it might be difficult to hold that the cash amount of the debt has accrued to the taxpayer in 
the year of assessment... but he has acquired a right to claim payment of debt in future. 
'According to what has been stated above, the value of this right must in my opinion be included in the 
taxpayer's gross income for taxation purposes.... but something must be deducted from their face value 
to allow for the fact that they were not payable at the close of year of the assessment.' 
51926CPD203, 2SATC16. 
6 At 2 SATC 16. 
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This judgment was supported by an analysis made in the Margo Report7. It read as follows: 
CIR v Hersov8 and CIR v Delfos9 
' . . . the test of entitlement is clearly appropriate as it determines when the assets exist in the business. 
. . . where a taxpayer has become entitled to a right in terms of which amount is payable in a future year 
of assessment, due allowance should be made in the valuation thereof for the futurity of that right 
beyond twelve months.' 
The result in the Lategan case was held to correctly reflect the law by the Commission of 
Enquiry into Fiscal and Monetary Policy in South Africa (the Margo Commission). It 
therefore recommended that no legislative resolution of the problem of the meaning of the 
word 'accrued' was necessary. 
The meaning of 'accrual' was scrutinised in ITC 52110 where a taxpayer made a claim to the 
insurer for the loss of trading stock through fire. The insurer compensated for the lost trading 
stock. The proceeds were included in gross income and subjected to tax. 
Years later it was discovered that there were additional amounts awarded by the insurer in 
terms of the policy to the taxpayer. These amounts were included in gross income and 
subjected to tax. The taxpayer objected on the grounds that these amounts were already 
included in gross income as accruals in the previous years of assessments. 
7 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South Africa (The 
Margo Commission Report), 1987. 
8 At 18 SATC 20. 
9 At 6 SATC 92. 
10 (1942), 12 SATC 408. 
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The appeal was dismissed. It was held that there could be no accrual of the claim before it was 
notified to the insurer and duly approved. The assessment was then confirmed and amounts 
were subjected to tax in that year of receipt. This is interesting because it not only brings the 
issue of timing to the meaning of the word 'accrued', but also dealt with the 'due and payable' 
meaning as highlighted in Lategan 's case. The amounts were payable in terms of the policy 
but were not 'due' because for that to happen, the payments had to be authorised. But before 
authorisation the taxpayer had to be notified. It is easy to understand the position of the 
taxpayer in this situation, because if the terms of the policy are that in the event of fire or 
other natural disaster the insurer will compensate the taxpayer, there would seem to be an 
accrual to the taxpayer. 
It is understandable for the taxpayer to assume that when the event happened the accrual took 
place at that time, even before notifying and obtaining approval from the insurer. This shows 
that the legislature needs to revisit the meaning of the term 'accrued to', otherwise the courts 
are likely to be inundated with cases dealing with gross income on the issue of accrual. If 
there is no accrual the taxpayer will be able to argue that there is no amount to be included in 
gross income and therefore subjected to tax. 
In People's Stores, the taxpayer, a subsidiary in the Edgars group of companies, was a retailer 
of clothing. The taxpayer was in the trade of selling goods on a 'six-month revolving credit 
scheme'. The customer under the scheme had to pay the taxpayer in six equal instalments. On 
the last day of the year of assessment in issue the instalments outstanding in the books of the 
taxpayer amounted to R341 281. This amount was payable in the following year of 
assessment. The Commissioner included this amount in the taxpayer's gross income in that 
year of assessment. The taxpayer objected to the assessment raised by the Commissioner on 
the grounds that the outstanding instalments were neither payable nor paid during that current 
year of assessment. In the alternative the taxpayer argued that if the Commissioner had to 
include the instalments outstanding, he should include only the present value of the amount, 
not its face value. 
The critical issue in this case was whether the amount accrues to the taxpayer when it is 'due' 
that is when he becomes entitled to it, or when it is only due and payable. It was held that an 
amount accrues to the taxpayer in the year that he becomes entitled to it. There was 
controversy around the correctness of the ruling that the terms 'accrued to' or in 'favour of 
merely envisage that the person concerned has become entitled to the amount in question. 
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The Appellate Division upheld the accrual principle. It confirmed that it meant entitlement 
and further confirmed the present value concept in terms of which an amount may be 
deducted because it is not immediately payable. 
This resulted in an amendment to the definition of 'gross income' with effect from 23 May 
1990 with a proviso being added. This proviso states that if the accrual is reflected at its 
present value in the current year the discounted factor would be deemed to accrue in the 
subsequent year. 
But it then provides that any tax returns submitted after that date would be taxable at their 
face values and not discounted to net present values. This amendment to the definition of 
'gross income' did not bring any clarity to the meaning of the term 'accrued to'. Instead it 
distorted even further the little harmony between the income tax system and commercial and 
economic reality. It equates in value for tax purposes the cash payment and an amount 
receivable in a near future. It does not make any economic and business sense. 
For example, consider a taxpayer who sells fashion clothes on credit. The amount owing is 
due, but is payable only over a period of twelve months, as is common these days. Assume 
that this sale occurred on the last day of year of assessment. The taxpayer will be taxed on the 
full amount of the credit sale without taking into account the time value of money. This 
highlights the problem in the interpretation of the term 'accrued to' as used in the definition 
of'gross income'. 
The decision in People's Stores has been widely criticised for lacking a scientific approach to 
the law. The question that was supposed to be answered by this case was whether there is a 
relationship between an accrual and timing, or whether the accrual means the quality of a 
particular amount. In simple terms, does accrual mean that the taxpayer has a vested right of 
income, or does it mean that there is a potential for income in the future? Alternatively, does 
an accrual include both issues? No South African court has identified this problem and none 
have responded to it. If the latter view is adopted, then a potential amount that is due and 
payable in future will not be classified as an amount for inclusion in gross income until it 
qualifies to be an amount for inclusion in gross income. 
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The decision in People's Stores was also criticised for adopting an abstract approach, in that it 
considered the quality of an item as 'non-income' or 'income' rather than focusing on the 
circumstances around a particular taxpayer. 
The correctness of the judgment was also criticised in that the terms 'accrued to' and 'in 
favour of merely mean that the person has become entitled to the amount in question. 
In Ochberg v CIRU Watermeyer J, made it clear that before an amount can accrue, the 
taxpayer's right to claim payment must be unconditional. If the right to claim future 
instalments is conditional or dependent upon performance by the taxpayer of certain 
obligations or fulfilment of certain terms, for example, the obligation to deliver property or 
render services, or the approval by a third party, there can be no accrual in terms of the Act. 
Accrual can take place only after the obligations have been complied with, or the conditions 
fulfilled. Until these events take place the taxpayer is not entitled to claim payment. The 
meaning of the term 'accrued to' was extended to unconditionally 'entitled to' in Mooi v SIR12 
where it was submitted this represented the correct meaning of 'accrued to'. 
Silkeu provides examples illustrating the Lategan's principle of the meaning of 'accrued to'. 
An assumption was made that in each situation the year of assessment ends on the last day of 
February. These examples are as follows: 
• A merchant sells goods for R100 on 17 February. In terms of the contract of sale the 
goods are to be delivered on 15 March. The R100 will accrue only on 15 March when the 
delivery takes place because, until that event takes place, the taxpayer is not 
unconditionally 'entitled to' the amount. He will be 'unconditionally entitled' to the 
amount only upon delivery of the goods. 
• A speculative builder of machines completes a machine on 1 February. The machine cost 
R3 000. On 28 February the market value of this machine is R4 000. It is sold and 
delivered on 10 March for R4 100. There is no accrual until 10 March, when the seller for 
the first time became entitled to the income. On 28 February, although the machine is 
already worth R4 000, there was no accrual since at that date the seller was not entitled to 
anything. An unrealised appreciation in value of trading stock is not taxable. 
U1933CPD256,6SATC1. 
121972 (1) SA675 (A), 34 SATC 1. 
13 Silke Silke on South African Income Tax Voll 2007 para 2.8. 
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• A company declares a dividend on 10 February payable to shareholders registered in its 
share register on that date. Payment of the dividend is to be made on 15 May. The accrual 
will be the date of declaration when the shareholders become entitled to it. 
• A company declares a dividend on 10 February payable on 15 May. The date of accrual is 
the date of declaration, namely, 10 February, when the shareholder becomes entitled to it. 
• A company declares a dividend on 10 February payable to shareholders registered in the 
share register on 1 March. The dividend is actually paid on 15 March. Here the date of 
accrual is 1 March when a shareholder is required to be registered so as to participate in 
the dividend. It is only on 1 March that it may be said that a shareholder is entitled to the 
dividend. 
As this example shows, this date is not necessarily the date of declaration, or the date of 
payment of the dividend. A dividend declared payable to shareholders registered at the 
date of declaration accrues on that date. The position with an interim dividend may be 
different if in law the interim dividend may be recalled by the directors of the company at 
any time before it is paid. On this basis the interim dividend will be included in gross 
income only when it is paid. 
• In terms of the building contract, 10% of the contract price is to be retained as 'retention 
moneys' until a final certificate is issued by the engineer. This will occur after a period of 
six months after the completion date of the building. The building was completed on 
28 January. The engineer's final certificate was issued, and the builder received the 
retention moneys, only on 31 August. Here the date of accrual of the retention moneys is 
the date of the engineer's final certificate, 31 August, because prior to that date the 
builder was not entitled to the retention moneys. 
Another area of interest is securities that contain an element of interest or dividend in their 
purchase price. Some shares, debentures or government stock come with dividends and 
interest. To whom does the dividend or interest accrue? 
If the interest or dividend has already accrued to the seller before the sale it will be included 
in the seller's gross income. If the interest or dividend accrues to the buyer after the sale, it 
will be included in the buyer's gross income. 
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When securities are bought and sold cum or ex dividend or cum or ex interest, the dividend or 
interest must be included in the gross income of the person to whom it accrues in terms of the 
Act. The anomaly about this is that it is not necessarily the person who is entitled to the 
benefit of the amount in terms of the contract. A situation may arise when a person is called 
upon to pay tax on an amount received by another person. 
Once an amount has accrued to a taxpayer it is taxable in his hands even if he thereafter 
disposes of it. The opposite is true when the taxpayer disposes of an amount before it accrues 
to him. In this situation the amount will not be taxable in his hands. This is termed cession of 
income. 
There are a number of cases dealing with the cession of income under the circumstances as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. In Hiddingh v CIRU the taxpayer divested himself of the 
right to the income before it accrued to him. The late Dr Hiddingh bequeathed to the taxpayer 
certain immovable property subject to the fideicommissum in favour of certain persons for 
three generations. In terms of the will, income from that immovable property accrued to the 
taxpayer for the period of his life. The property was then sold by an order of the court. The 
proceeds were transferred to the executor of the late Dr Hiddingh to hold and invest. 
The net income was to be awarded to the taxpayer during his lifetime. On his death, the 
executor was to deal with the income and capital as directed by the will. In 1943 the taxpayer 
assigned to certain relatives a portion of his income from the trust. 
The Commissioner included the moneys paid over to the relatives in the taxpayer's gross 
income as amounts accruing to the taxpayer. The taxpayer objected on the grounds that the 
amounts in question did not form part of his gross income because they did not accrue to him. 
141941AD111, 11 SATC205. 
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The issue was whether the amount in question had accrued to the taxpayer who then disposed 
of it, or whether the taxpayer disposed of it before it accrued to him. The question could be 
answered only through the terms of the written contract. The Appellate Division held that the 
taxpayer disposed of the income before it accrued to him. Accordingly it did not form part of 
his gross income. It was held that the effects of the cession entered into by the taxpayer were 
to divest him of the right to receive income before it accrued to him. 
The question whether the taxpayer has antecedently divested himself of income depends on 
the terms of a contract. For example, if the cession takes effect after the amount has accrued 
to the taxpayer it will continue to form part of his gross income. This is the question that was 
put to the court in Rishworth v CIR.15 The issue, in summary, was whether the rentals that the 
taxpayer's wife had ceded, continued to form part of her gross income, that is, did the cession 
take effect only after the rental had accrued to her? 
The taxpayer's wife had executed a cession agreement, granting the cessionary the sum of £50 
a month out of the rental due to her under a certain lease. This sum of money was to be paid 
directly to the cessionary. The Commissioner included this amount in the taxpayer's gross 
income. 
Holmes JA came to the conclusion and stated that on the proper construction of the cession 
agreement, the cession took effect only after the rental had accrued to the taxpayer. In his 
judgment he said,16 
'I come now to the consideration of the agreement of cession. The preamble indicates that Leslie H 
Chancellor should be entitled to a share of the rental payable in terms of the lease. What was agreed and 
done in the paragraph which I have lettered (Z>)... was that the appellant's wife ceded to him. ' . . . the 
right to receive, out of the shares of the rental payable to her under the said lease, the sum of £50 per 
month.' 
151964 (4) SA493 (A), 26 SATC 275. 
16At 26 SATC 275. 
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In other words she ceded the right to claim the rental as and when they became due and 
payable to her, since if she had divested of herself in advance it could never become payable 
to her. This indicated a monthly accrual to her upon which the cession would operate. He then 
stated the following:17 
' [I]n my view the foregoing aspects of the agreement of cession in this case, considered in their 
cumulative effect, lead to the conclusion that the rent accrued to the appellant's wife each month, and in 
respect of such accrual the cession applied pari passu'. 
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The decision in this case illustrates that a taxpayer can 
divest himself of the right to an amount, with the result that it thereafter accrues to someone 
else. In this case, however, the taxpayer failed to achieve an antecedent cession because the 
particular words used in the contract had the result that the cession took effect only after each 
month's rental had accrued to the taxpayer. It is implicit in the judgment that a different form 
of words could have achieved the taxpayer's objective. 
In ITC 141518 a minister of a particular religion regularly renounced, in writing, part of his 
salary to increase the funds of the church. It was held that he had no right to claim payment 
before his regular payday, and that he had always made his renunciations before that date. 
There was no accrual to him of the amount he had renounced. 
The critical difference between the decisions of the above two cases was the construction of 
the contract. In the latter case the cession was effective before, and in the former case the 
cession was effective after, the accrual date. It is important when constructing an agreement 
of cession to word it properly because bad wording could be detrimental to a party ceding an 
amount to another person. 
In CIR v Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs19 it was held that the proceeds of a race 
meeting accrued to the taxpayer as income, notwithstanding that it had been handed over to 
charities. 
17 At 26 SATC275. 
18(1936) (48) SATC 179. 
"i960 (3) SA291 (A), 23 SATC 380. 
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The facts in Witwatersrand Association of the Racing Clubs differed remarkably from those 
that confronted the court in C:SARS v Cape Consumers (Pty) Ltd.20 In the former case, the 
taxpayer organised a race meeting and paid over the profits to two designated charities. There 
was no prior entitlement that the two charities enjoyed to the money. Rather, the association 
decided that whatever profits accrued to it, it would pay them to charities. In contrast, in the 
latter case, the company was obliged by its articles of association to credit the amount earned 
to its Buyers' Reserve Fund. In terms of the legal relationships between the company and its 
buyers, the moneys were not for its own benefit, but for the benefit of the buyers. Accordingly 
there was no prior receipt or accrual within the defined meaning as was the position in the 
Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs case. 
For a cession to be effective from the income tax point of view it must operate in such a way 
that the cedent has no right to claim income in future. The court will examine the content of 
the contract and ascertain that the cedent has divested himself of the right to claim income 
when it accrues in the future. The divestment is effective whether it involves the cession of a 
right to receive payments in the future, or of the income generated by an asset that is 
controlled by the cedent. The cession need not necessarily be in writing, it could be an oral 
agreement, and it is as effective as a written agreement. 
This was illustrated in ITC 26521 when the taxpayer had taken transfer of a property 
previously owned by his mother. There was a verbal agreement between the taxpayer and his 
mother that she should continue to receive the rentals derived from the property for the 
duration of her lifetime, should she not occupy the property herself. Notwithstanding that the 
agreement or servitude was not registered against the title of ownership held by the taxpayer. 
It was held on appeal that although unenforceable as against third parties, the verbal 
agreement had the effect of creating servitude in her favour. It was binding between the 
taxpayer and his mother and had to be accepted for tax purposes. The rentals were 
accordingly held to have accrued to the taxpayer's mother and not to him. 
The practice adopted by the Commissioner is that cession of income accompanied by a 
complete cession of all rights to the assets producing income is valid for income tax purposes 
provided that the cession is valid in law. 
201994 (4) SA1213 (C), 61 SATC 91. 
217 SATC 149. 
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When it is a right of income that is disposed of, the income accrues to the recipient of the 
right, and not to the person who disposed of the right (Rishworth v SIR).22 
In ITC 140523 a taxpayer who, as a means of providing additional security for an overdraft 
facility, arranged for the income due to him from a trust to be paid to the bank. He was found 
not to have ceded his right to the income and was therefore liable for tax on it. The taxpayer 
lost because his arrangement was a not a complete cession of all rights to the income. It was a 
payment arrangement as some sort of security. Also this amount was transferred to the trust 
only after it had accrued to the taxpayer. 
For a cession to be effective from the income tax point of view, it must operate in a way that 
the cedent has no right to claim the future income (CIR, Transkei, and another v Moodie and 
anther)?A This is supported by the decision taken in ITC 1405. There are a number of cases 
dealing with cession of income. The common denominator in them is that there must be a 
complete transfer of rights to the income. 
The agreement must also be valid in law for it to be valid from an income tax point of view. 
The last issue to be emphasised is that the agreement does not have to be in writing.25 
If the legislature adopted the same approach adopted by the accounting profession with 
regards to definition of the term, 'accrued to' the position could be less complicated. 
Accounting for receipts and accruals in the accounting environment is strictly in terms of 
principles contained in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). GAAP has a 
number of individual statements dealing with individual line items as disclosed in the balance 
sheet and income statement. 
AC 111 is a revenue statement dealing with the accounting treatment of revenue. Revenue can 
be equated to gross income for income tax purposes even though the contents of the latter are 
not properly defined in the Act. 
1964 (4) SA493 (A), 26 SATC 275. 
(1985)48SATC46 
1993 (2) SA501 (TkAD), 55 SATC 164. 
(1985) 48 SATC 46 
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Without going into details of this statement, it is important to highlight the salient features of 
the statement. These are as follows: 
• Sale of goods or rendering of services. 
• The use by others of enterprise assets yielding interest, royalties and dividends. Under 
AC 111 revenue is defined as the gross inflows of economic benefits during the period 
arising in the course of the ordinary activities of an enterprise when those inflows result 
in an increase in equity. 
• The statement groups transactions into services rendered, sale of goods and income-
yielding assets. These groups are accounted for differently in the books of account. (This 
is dealt with in detail under timing of accrual.) But it is important to highlight another 
critical feature of this statement. If it is not probable that income will be received, it will 
not be accounted for in the books of account. Unfortunately this is not the situation for 
normal tax. 
In terms of AC111, income is earned only once it is probable that the economic benefit 
associated with the transaction will flow to the entity. It could be argued that it is probable is 
anything between 50% and 100%. But at least there is some guideline as to when income is 
earned for purposes of inclusion in the gross revenue of the taxpayer. The Act does not have a 
clear definition or other provision similar to the definition as per AC 111. But Appellate 
Division decisions have included entitlement, due and payable and unconditional entitlement 
to try to define the accrual of income. In essence it is about probability that there must be 
some certainty to receive income. Unfortunately the Act does not provide clarity with regard 
to the accrual of income. 
The last issue to be dealt with in this chapter is the concept of contingent rights. 
A contingent right in literal terms is a right that is dependent on the occurrence of certain 
future events. The vesting of this right is dependent upon the fulfilment of certain conditions 
and therefore it can never be a vested right. 
A vested right is a right of ownership coupled with the right of enjoyment. The opposite holds 
for a conditional or a contingent right. Its enforceability is delayed until the happening of an 
uncertain future event. It is sometimes regarded as a chance or a possibility right. 
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In accounting terms this right is called a contingent asset. In terms of AC 130, a statement of 
GAAP, a contingent asset is not recognised in the books of account, or specifically in 
financial statements. The statement provides a definition and guidelines that are not far from 
certain judicial decisions on the treatment of a contingent right or asset. These are as follows: 
Contingent assets usually arise from unplanned or other unexpected events that give rise to 
the possibility of an inflow of economic benefits (income for tax purposes) to the entity. An 
entity for tax purposes means any taxpayer, because the legislation taxes all persons who 
trade. It could be trading services for a salary or trading goods for income. An example is a 
claim that an enterprise is pursuing through a legal process, when the outcome is uncertain. 
Contingent assets are not recognised in the financial statements since this may result in the 
recognition of income that may never be realised. But, when the realisation of income is 
virtually certain, then the related asset is not a contingent asset, and its recognition is 
appropriate. 
A contingent asset is disclosed if an inflow of economic benefits is probable. 
A contingent right, when comparing accounting principles to judicial decisions, cannot be a 
vested right. This principle was illustrated in Mooi v SIR.26 The details of this case appear in 
Chapter 5, and it suffices to focus only on the judgment of the case for now. In arriving at his 
decision Ogilvie Thompson CJ said the following:27 
'I am of the opinion that no accrual within the meaning of the definition of "gross income" occurred in 
July 1963... but that the relevant accrual occurred when the option became exercisable on 1 September 
1966. The real benefit conferred upon appellant which was at all material times in the contemplation of 
all concerned, was the right to apply for shares at Rl,25 a share and that right arose when, upon 
fulfilment of the condition of the option, the latter became exercisable.' 
1972 (1) SA675 (A), 34 SATC1 at 10. 
At34SATClatlO. 
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In summary the judgment of this case confirmed that a contingent right is not a vested right 
and cannot be regarded as an amount 'received by' or 'accrued to' for the definition of 'gross 
income' even though a contingent right has a money value at the time of acquisition of the 
right. But it is important to differentiate between a contingent right and a delayed right. A 
delayed or postponed right that does not depend upon the occurrence of an uncertain future 
event is not contingent but a vested right in the legal sense of the term. For example, an 
employer undertakes to pay an employee double his salary on 24 December 2004 without any 
conditions attached, as a gesture of goodwill. The employee's right is not conditional. It is 
therefore a vested right whose enjoyment is delayed or postponed to a date that is certain to 
arrive. In Mooi v SIR,28 it was suggested if a spes has accrued to taxpayer; it must be valued to 
determine the amount for inclusion in gross income. If the right has no value, or it is 
impossible to value it, then there could not be an amount to be included in the gross income of 
the taxpayer. 
In ITC 52129 it was held that amounts payable under an insurance policy did not accrue to the 
taxpayer until the claim was submitted to the insurer and approved. 
In the construction industry it is common that a certain percentage of the purchase price is 
withheld by the buyer of the property. These moneys are called retention moneys and are paid 
subject to the certificate of approval by an engineer. In Building Contractors v COT30 it was 
held that the retention moneys did not accrue to the taxpayer until the certificate was issue by 
an engineer. 
Another example is when a taxpayer is offered a discount on its liability if it pays within a 
specified period of time. The right to a discount is dependant upon him paying before a 
specified date and it is not a vested right. 
Unfortunately these arguments cannot be supported by any provision of the Act but could be 
argued in the court of law. The definition of 'gross income' in its present form leaves much 
to be desired. It is unlikely to be amended in the near future to cater for the realities of the 
business environment. 
1972 (1) SA675 (A), 34 SATC 1. 
(1942)12SATC408. 
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Chapter 3 
Meaning of 'received by' the taxpayer and 'beneficial receipt' 
The amount 'received by' the taxpayer for services to be rendered is included in his gross 
income in the year of assessment when that receipt occurs. This principle applies even if 
services are to be rendered over a period of more than one year of assessment. The taxpayer is 
not allowed to apportion this receipt over the years of assessments. It is not uncommon that an 
amount is received before it is accrued. 
For example, a rental deposit received before the rental is due, an amount received in advance 
for a construction of a building, salary or fees paid in advance are included in gross income 
when they are received because they are revenue receipts not capital receipts. 
Amounts of a revenue nature received in advance must not be confused with capital amounts, 
for example, loans that are repayable in future even though these moneys are set off against 
revenue income. For example, staff loans paid out of the salary of an employee and a loan to a 
builder paid out of his contract price. 
Amounts received in advance may result in an overstatement of income for that particular 
year of assessment and do not reflect a true position of the profits in accounting terms, but the 
Act is not based on accounting principles and it taxes receipts and accruals when they occur 
whichever comes first. This is other anomaly created by the definition of 'gross income' as 
contained in the Act. It does not take into account the economic aspect of the transaction. 
1941SR233, 12SATC182. 
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Deposits and receipts in advance are included in gross income unless they are trust moneys 
not held by the taxpayer for his own benefit. 
There are a number of cases dealing with amounts received in advance that shed some light on 
the term 'received by' as used in the definition of 'gross income'. 
In ITC 52531 the issue that was put before the court was whether the taxpayer by contract 
could determine in which years of assessment an amount was to be included in his gross 
income. This was dismissed by the court citing the fact that the Act states that income is 
included in gross income in the year of receipt or accrual whichever comes first. This 
principle could not be overridden by any contractual agreement. 
A payment received by the taxpayer as a consideration for services to be rendered in future 
years is included in his gross income in the year of receipt. In ITC 70232 the critical issue was 
to determine whether the whole or only part of the consideration of £12 500 should be 
included in the taxpayer's gross income for the year of assessment in question. 
The taxpayer company was a technical consultant and adviser. During the year of assessment 
in question the taxpayer was paid £12 500 in the form of 12 500 fully paid up shares with a 
nominal value of £1 each in a company to which the taxpayer had rendered services in that 
year of assessment. The taxpayer was to render similar services to the company in future years 
of assessment. Instead of receiving the amount in cash the taxpayer received the amount in 
shares. 
The Commissioner included the full £12 500 and subjected it to tax. The taxpayer objected on 
the grounds that the two agreements in terms of which the shares were received should be 
read together, and if this were done, the amount received was to be regarded as a payment in 
advance for services to be rendered over a period often years. 
The representative of the company went further saying that the whole amount was not to be 
included in gross income in the year of receipt, but it should have been apportioned and be 
included in proportions over the ten-year period. The Act does not allow an apportionment of 
31(1942) 12 SATC 424. 
32(1950) 17 SATC 206. 
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included in proportions over the ten-year period. The Act does not allow an apportionment of 
amounts received or accrued, the Commissioner does not have the authority to do that since 
he is governed by the Act. There is not a practice note on apportionment or a known definitive 
case dealing with apportionment. 
The taxpayer lost the appeal because the amount was not of a capital nature and it had been 
received by the taxpayer in that year of assessment. If an amount received by or accrued to a 
taxpayer is not of capital nature, except for the special inclusions provided for in 
paragraphs (a) to («), it will be included in gross income in terms of its definition in section 1 
of the Act. 
The amount was included in gross income because it met the requirement of being 'received 
by' the taxpayer and the amount was not in question. The taxpayer's argument was based on 
accounting principles. In accounting terms amounts received in advance for services to be 
rendered will be treated as a liability. If services have not been rendered the amount in 
question has not been earned, and if it has not been earned, it is not income but accounted for 
as a liability in terms of AC 130 Statement of GAAP. But the Act is not based on accounting 
principle. 
More than being received, the amount must be 'received by' the taxpayer on his own behalf 
and for his own benefit. ITC 702 met all these criteria and accordingly it was included in 
gross income. This is illustrated in Geldenhys v CIR 33 where a decision had to be taken on 
whether a sum of money was received or accrued to the taxpayer on the sale of a flock of 
sheep. 
The taxpayer, a widow, was a farmer. She and her late husband were married in community of 
property and had made a joint will on their estate. On the death of either one of them, the 
surviving spouse would enjoy the fruits and income of the estate for his or her lifetime. The 
children would be the heirs of the joint estate. The taxpayer's husband died, and in terms of 
the will she was to enjoy the benefits conferred on her for the rest of her life. One of the 
assets of the estate was the flock of sheep which at the death of her husband was valued at 
£1 451. Unfortunately due to a severe drought a number of sheep died. Thereafter the flock of 
sheep never reached its former level because of the drought. The farm was then considered to 
(1950) 17 SATC 206. 
1974 (3) SA 256, 14SATC419. 
'Received by' and 'accrued to' 24 
be overstocked. In 1943 the taxpayer gave up farming. Her children agreed that the flock of 
sheep should be sold. The taxpayer received £4 941. 
The £3 490 included in the taxpayer's gross income was the difference between the value 
when the taxpayer acquired the right to income (£1 451) and the amount realised when the 
flock of sheep was sold (£4 941). 
The taxpayer appealed on the grounds that the flock of sheep did not belong to her but was the 
property of her children. The court upheld the appeal on the grounds that the taxpayer was a 
usufructuary of the flock of sheep and at the time of realisation she had no entitlement to the 
flock of sheep, the whole proceeds belonged to the heirs and did not form part of her gross 
income. 
The increase in the value of the flock of sheep between the inception of the usufruct and the 
sale of the flock of sheep did not accrue to the usufructuary because the usufruct was for the 
flock sheep not its monetary value. Therefore the differential amount of £3 490 was subject to 
the usufruct and accrued to the heirs and not to the taxpayer as usufructuary. It was irrelevant 
that the amount was received by the taxpayer and that she gave the receipt in her own name 
and the proceeds were deposited in her own bank account. The usufruct continued to exist 
over the proceeds of the sale and she was dealing with those proceeds as in terms of the will. 
In law, the ownership of the proceeds vested and accrued to the heirs. 
The issue of 'received by' for the benefit of the taxpayer was also dealt with in the 
Zimbabwean case COT v G. 34 The taxpayer was a government employee over a period of four 
years. He was in a position of responsibility and as part of his responsibilities he was 
entrusted with government funds for secret operations. He misused his position of trust to 
obtain from the government from time to time more money than was legitimately required. 
The excess moneys were misappropriated by the taxpayer for his own benefit. The money was 
either put in his bank account or used to buy goods for his private consumption. 
The taxpayer over the period of four years stole a total amount of $58 000. He was convicted 
and sentenced to imprisonment, a part of which was suspended on condition that the amount 
owed by the taxpayer was repaid in full. The money was repaid by the taxpayer in full. 
1981 (4) SA 167 (ZA), 43 SATC 159. 
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The Commissioner included the moneys fraudulently received by the taxpayer in his gross 
income and it became assessable to tax. The Commissioner went further by imposing 
penalties in terms of section 35 of the Act. 
The argument of the Commissioner was based on the fact that gross income as defined by 
section 8(1) of the Act meant every amount received by or accrued to or in favour of a 
taxpayer in a year of assessment, and that what the taxpayer stole he received in terms of that 
definition. 
The taxpayer relied on the same definition of 'gross income'. He argued that the moneys he 
stole never became his, despite his intention to treat them as his own, and they were therefore 
never 'received by' him within the meaning of that term as used in the definition of 'gross 
income '. 
Fieldsend CJ in his judgment said the following:35 
'I can see no warrant on the face of the statute for construing the word 'received' in s8 in any but its 
ordinary meaning. To extend it to cover a unilateral taking such as theft, which in any event confers no 
right upon the taker to the things taken, would be to give the word a meaning that could not be justified 
on any rational construction of the Act as whole. In short a thief takes, he does not receive, and that is 
what the taxpayer in this case did.... in my view the taxpayer in the appeal before us did not receive the 
money, he stole. This I think is a sufficient basis upon which to decide the appeal, but I would not be 
doing justice to the argument if I were to leave the matter there. It was common cause the word 
'received' was not to be given its ordinary wide meaning and that it had to be limited at least to meaning 
'received as part of the recipient's patrimony.' 
1981 (4)At43SATC 159. 
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The learned judge went further and dealt with the issue of intention of both parties to the 
transaction. The intention of both parties, that is not only that of the taker, but also that of a 
giver, was important for the meaning of the term 'received by' as defined in the definition of 
'gross income'. A practical example to illustrate the importance of the intention of both 
parties was that of a person who borrows a lawnmower from his neighbour with the genuine 
intention of returning it. He does not receive the lawnmower on his own behalf, nor does a 
person who fraudulently induces his neighbour to lend him his mower with the intention of 
keeping it himself. The person will not receive the mower in his own right, because his 
intention alone does not confer to him this right. The intention of the giver is important, 
before the item is 'received by' the person in his own right. He can receive the mower in his 
own right only if the giver intends that the other person receives it, not a unilateral taking. 
This principle was applied to the present case. It was found that the government never 
intended that the moneys taken by the taxpayer should be used by him for private purposes. It 
was to be used for secret operations on its behalf. It was paid to him for a specific purpose and 
therefore the moneys received by the taxpayer were not received on his own behalf and for his 
benefit. The moneys were not to be included in gross income, and assessable to tax, because it 
did not fall within his gross income and should not have been taxed. 
This decision, even though not a South African decision, highlights another anomaly in the 
definition of 'gross income' in general for most countries. This case was decided by Appellate 
Division of the High Court in Zimbabwe. 
In CIR v Genu & Co (Pty) Ltd36 it was held that borrowed moneys or loans were not received 
nor did they accrue to the taxpayer within the meaning of the definition of 'gross income '. 
The moment the person receives a loan he is obliged to repay it. It was further held that the 
physical control over money or money's worth did not constitute a receipt or an accrual. 
For example, an attorney or accountant could receive money in trust on behalf of a client. The 
money received will not be included in the gross income of that attorney or accountant 
because he has received the money not on his own behalf and not for his benefit. 
1955(3)SA293,20SATC113. 
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On the issue of the loan, if it is issued with the understanding that it will not be paid in future 
then the real transaction will be looked at. Again if the loan is not in fact a loan, but is for 
services rendered, then it will be income in the hands of the recipient. 
In the Australian case of Scott v FCT37 the taxpayer was a solicitor who received a gift of 
£10 000 from a client by the name of Mrs Freestone. The taxpayer had previously acted for 
her with regards to her late husband's estate. Mrs Freestone had paid him separately and in 
full for all services rendered. The critical issue to be decided upon in this case was whether 
the gift or money given to the taxpayer was income. 
Windeyer J suggested that for a receipt to be income depends upon its quality in the hands of 
the recipient. It does not depend upon whether the provider or giver was lawfully obliged to 
make that payment. He went further and stated that exceptional gifts that are not incidental to 
a man's calling or occupation cannot be income. 
The issue of gratuitous gifts is a 'question of mixed law and fact'. In this regard he stated the 
following: 
'An unsolicited gift does not, in my opinion, become part of the income of the recipient merely because 
generosity was inspired by goodwill and the goodwill can be traced to gratitude engendered by some 
services rendered.' 
This case illustrates an important principle with regards to gifts. Payments or gifts made out 
of generosity or goodwill without any legal obligation can sometimes be described as income 
and in other times not. The word gift can have more than one meaning, in Roman-Dutch Law 
out of goodwill, sheer liberality or out disinterested kindness on the part of the donor was 
called a donatio propria or a donatio mera. This type of gift would never be categorised as 
'income' in the hands of the recipient. On the other hand, gifts that are regularly received and 
incidental to a particular employment would be income in the hands of the recipient. 
A common example of the latter scenario is a tip to waiter in a restaurant after a meal has 
been served. A tip to a bell boy in a hotel for carrying luggage for hotel guests is another 
example. 
(1966) 117 CLR 514 (High Court of Australia). 
'At20SATC113. 
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It is submitted that although this case was decided in Australia, its principle holds true in 
South African tax law. Whether a particular receipt is income does not depend upon whether 
it was payment that the payer was legally obliged to make. This principle was unfortunately 
misinterpreted and used to arrive at the wrong decision in CIR v Lunnon.39 
Without going into the details of this case, it is important to state that the critical issue of the 
case was whether the gratuity paid to the taxpayer formed part of his gross income. It was 
held in the negative. The payment of the money was not the solutio of an obligation. The 
amount was then held to be a gift and therefore of a capital nature. The taxpayer in this case 
was a director, who had resigned six months earlier and the payment was for services 
rendered by him as a board member. 
The decision in Lunnon led to the amendment in the definition of 'gross income' to include 
paragraph (c). It includes in gross income: 
' any amount including any voluntary awards received or accrued in respect of services rendered or to be 
rendered or any amount (other than amounts referred to in section 8(1) received or accrued in respect of 
or by virtue of any employment or the holding of any office . . . ' 
In Scott the court decided that the fact that the taxpayer had in the past rendered services was 
not enough to conclude that the payment or gift was income in the hands of the taxpayer. 
But the court agreed that the gratitude which inspired the gift was engendered by rendering of 
those services. This principle will hold true in South Africa, both at common law, and in 
terms of paragraph (c) of the definition of'gross income'. 
Applying paragraph (c) of the definition of ' gross income ', it can be said that a birthday 
present, a casual present, or a Christmas gift from an employer to an employee is income in 
the hands of the recipient, because it is closely related to employment or because there is a 
causal link between the amount received and services rendered. 
1942 AD 94, 1 SATC 7. 
'(1942)1SATC7. 
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If a taxpayer receives an amount on his own behalf and for his own benefit in pursuance of a 
void transaction the amount is nevertheless 'received' within the literal meaning of the word. 
The legality of the transaction does not have an effect on the amounts received for inclusion 
in gross income. In fact the definition of 'gross income' is silent on the issue of the legality of 
transactions. 
In ITC 162441 a business involved in customs clearing and freight forwarding fraudulently 
claimed wharfage fees disbursed by it in excess of the actual expenditure. It therefore 
recovered more than it incurred. 
It was held that where a taxpayer receives money in the course of carrying on of its trade 
through fraudulent claims or negligent misrepresentation to customers, it receives the money 
and has intended to receive it as part of the business income. The amount was included in 
gross income and subjected to taxation. 
Again an illegal or fraudulent transaction does not change the nature of the receipt from 
income to capital. The amount is received and because it is received within the literal meaning 
of the word, it will be taxable. 
The Income Tax Practice Manual provides the following guidelines:42 
• Advances received against the value of livestock, produce or other merchandise delivered 
to agents or co-operative societies for disposal or shipment are not income for tax 
purposes. Income in these situations accrues only when goods so delivered have actually 
been realised for and on account of the deliverer. 
• If a taxpayer takes credit in his accounts for advances, there is no objection to their 
treatment as taxable income, but this action may not be taken without the consent of the 
taxpayer. 
• An advance payment in view of a termination of a contract of service is an accrual on the 
date of its receipt. 
'(1996) 59 SATC 373. 
''Income Tax Practice Manual (2004) Issue 14 page A-29 
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• In terms of section 8(1) (a) any allowance or advance paid by an employer to a director, 
employee or another person for the travelling expenses, or another service must, to the 
extent that it cannot be proved to have been actually expended by the recipient on 
travelling, be included in the recipient's taxable income. In addition with effect from 
1 August 2002 these unexpended amounts are subject to PAYE. 
• Payments received for services to be rendered are gross income as defined in section 1, 
provided that the amounts have been received during the year of assessment and are not of 
a capital nature. 
Thus a conclusion was arrived at by the Special Court in ITC 67543 where the appellant 
company's business of poultry farming included the supply of day-old chicks to customers in 
terms of a contract embodied in a printed form. The contract provided for payment of the 
purchase price in advance. It was refundable if the company failed to deliver all, or part, of 
the order. The delivery date and the condition of goods on arrival were not guaranteed. Orders 
were not subject to cancellation by customers. The amounts received in advance were 
accounted for as liabilities in the books of account. These amounts were treated as deposits 
received for containers and against poultry to be supplied. Commissioner included these 
amounts received in advance in the gross income of the company, and subjected them to tax. 
The matter was referred to the Special Court on appeal. The Special Court dismissed the 
appeal rejecting the argument advanced by the representative of the taxpayer that amounts 
received in advance represented trust moneys. It decided on the facts that the customers were 
just merely concurrent creditors. The case was therefore not one of income subject to a trust. 
It was accordingly held that, in terms of section 1 the amounts were properly included in the 
gross income of the company for the years when the deposits were received. 
In conclusion the President said the following:44 
'There can be little doubt that, viewing the matter from the aspects of a correct computation of the 
profits made by the taxpayer, the conclusion arrived at must be regarded as repugnant to correct 
accounting principle. But as we observed by Davis, AJA, in Pyott's case (13 (A), SATC 126) that whilst 
there is no doubt it is in accordance with those principles to make this provision in the Balance Sheet, 
the answer is that an Income Tax Act has laid down what is to be taxed even if doing so it may be said to 
disregard those principles.' 
(1949)16 SATC 238. 
'At 16 SATC 238. 
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In ITC 70745 an undertaker who carried on a funeral insurance business conducted in addition 
to his normal business a prepaid funeral scheme for persons not accepted in the insurance 
fund. 
The scheme, subject to certain condition resulted in the undertaker receiving payments in 
advance for funeral services to be rendered in future. These amounts were included in the 
gross income of the taxpayer and subjected to tax. The taxpayer appealed to the Special 
Court. It dismissed the appeal and held that the amounts received for future services 
constituted the ordinary revenue or income of the business. 
The court went further and stated that the moneys so received were not put in a trust fund and 
that the taxpayer had at all material times dealt with the these moneys in the ordinary course 
of his business as his own property. 
The last two mentioned cases illustrate the importance of separating moneys received for 
services to be rendered in future. If these amounts were deposited in a separate bank account, 
not as part of the taxpayers' funds the decisions arrived at by the Special Court could have 
been favourable to both taxpayers. Some tax planning on the side of the taxpayers may have 
saved them some tax. 
In pure accounting terms these taxpayers were not entitled to these amounts until the 
rendering of the services. Unfortunately as mentioned by the President of the Special Court in 
one of the quoted cases that the Act is not based on accounting principles. Moneys received 
will be taxed in terms of the Act even if it violates those accounting principles. The definition 
of 'gross income' would be simplified if it adopted accounting principles that define terms 
and concepts with clarity. A good example is AC 112, a statement dealing with changes in 
foreign exchange rates. The corresponding provision in the Act is section 241. 
45(1950)17SATC224. 
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Without going into details in comparing the two, any foreign exchange movement is treated in 
exactly the same way. If the exchange movement results in a gain the amount is treated as 
income in terms of AC 112 and section 241 of the Act. The opposite is true when an exchange 
loss is suffered. 
It will be a deductible expense in terms of the Act and treated as an expense in the books of 
accounts in terms of AC 112. Even the calculation of these exchange movements are 
performed in the same way. 
Section 24J, a specific provision of the Act dealing with interest, is another provision that 
follows an accounting principle. Under this provision interest accrues or is incurred on a daily 
basis. 
So far this chapter has dealt mainly with the meaning of 'received by'. But something more is 
required for an amount received to be included in gross income. An amount is not 'received 
by' a taxpayer nor does an amount 'accrues to' him unless it is received by the taxpayer on his 
own behalf and for his benefit. This beneficial receipt or accrual has been covered, but not in 
detail, in the previous paragraphs. 
This principle was illustrated in Geldenhuys v CIR. When a person receives an amount as a 
usufrutuary that amount does not form part of his gross income but is included in the gross 
income of the holder of the bare dominium. 
Another example is moneys received by a parent as a guardian of a child. This amount is not 
included in the gross income of the parent, but included in the gross income of the child. 
An amount received by the taxpayer as a refundable deposit for a sale on revenue account is 
included in his gross income unless he holds it as a trustee. This was a principle that was 
adopted in Pyott Ltd v CIR.*6 The critical issue in this case was whether the deposits paid on 
the tins accrued to the taxpayer on its behalf and for its benefit. 
1945 AD 128, 13 SATC 121. 
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The taxpayer was in the business of manufacturing biscuits. In addition to biscuits the 
taxpayer had a factory that manufactured the tins in which the biscuits were sold. The tins 
were sold together with the biscuits. A sale was raised in one invoice. The tins were sold to 
customers at cost plus a marginal mark up. 
The price of tins was refundable to customers if they returned the tins to the taxpayer in good 
condition. In the year of assessment ending June 1941 the taxpayer set aside £9 000 as a 
provision for refunds payable to customers who returned the tins in good condition. 
This amount was not included in the income of the taxpayer but was shown as a liability in its 
books. The Commissioner refused to allow this treatment of the moneys received as 
refundable deposits. The matter was ultimately referred to the Appellate Division for a 
decision. 
The fact that the taxpayer was contractually obliged to accept the tins and refund the 
customers if the tins were in good condition was not contested. 
Davis AJA held that the deposits were not trust moneys. If they had been, they would not have 
been included in the accounts of the taxpayer. These moneys were not capital and therefore 
must be income for there is no halfway house between the two categories. In his judgment he 
stated that he understood that in terms of the relevant accounting principle, the taxpayer had 
to provide in its balance sheet for amounts refundable to customers should they return the tins. 
But he further emphasised that the Act is not based on accounting principles. The moneys 
remained income. They were beneficially received by the taxpayer even though he did not 
disclose them as income in his books. 
The same principle was adopted in Brookes Lemos Ltd v CIR.41 The taxpayer was in the same 
position when it received a deposit that was refundable subject to the return of bottles to the 
taxpayer. The issue to be decided by the court was whether the moneys received formed part 
of the taxpayers' gross income. It was held that the taxpayer did not hold the deposits as a 
trustee or pledge. 
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This case extended the principle adopted in Pyott Ltd v CIR. It was held that when the 
taxpayer receives a deposit, the amount is received on his own behalf and for his benefit 
unless he is a trustee in the strict legal sense of the word, in relation to the amount he has 
received. It is not enough that the money is set aside or it is not treated as income by the 
taxpayer. The test is not how the amount is treated, or how as a matter of business, or good 
accounting practice, it ought to be treated, but whether as a matter of law the amount was held 
in trust. The taxpayer had to create a trust account in which the amounts would be deposited 
and held until refunded to customers as and when the need arose. 
The taxpayer would then be a trustee, not a recipient, and these amounts would not be 
accounted for in the taxpayer's books of account. 
The issue of deposits received in advance was visited years later in Greases (SA) Ltdv CIR.4S 
The same question was asked. Did the deposit form part of the taxpayer's income? It was held 
in the affirmative, because the facts of this case were no different from the facts in the 
Brookes Lemos case. 
In summary, the taxpayer was in the business of selling grease in drums. Because of a 
limitation of drums the taxpayer took a decision not to supply drums to its customers. The 
customers were required to pay a deposit of £1 a drum. It was later increased to £2 a drum. 
The taxpayer argued that the refundable deposit was not part of the purchase price of the drum 
but was some form of assurance that the drums would be returned. The deposits were not 
treated as sales in the accounting records of the company. They were credited to a Drums 
Suspense Account. It was debited every time a refund was paid to a customer. 
The deposits were included in the taxpayer's business account. They were used in the 
ordinary course of its business. These moneys received in advance were not deposited in a 
separate trust account. 
1947 (2) SA976 (A), 14 SATC 295. 
1951 (3) SA518 (A), 17 SATC 358. 
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The Commissioner included the amounts received in advance in the taxpayer's gross income 
for all the years of assessment affected, but allowed as a deduction the cost of drums held by 
the customers at the end of each year of assessment. The taxpayer objected. The matter was 
ultimately referred to the court for a decision. 
In arriving at his conclusion Centlivres CJ said,49 
' . . . . [t]he dominating fact in the present case is that the appellant, although it opened a Drums Suspense 
Account, received the deposits for its own benefit, in that it was entitled to use these deposits in its 
business and the moneys were not deposited to any trust account. . . . the deposits became and were 
intended both by the appellant and its customers to become the absolute property of the appellant and it 
could use them as it pleased; and the fact that it had undertaken to pay such of their customers as 
returned drums an amount equivalent to the amount which they had paid as deposits in respect of those 
drums did not constitute the appellant a trustee with regard to those deposits'. 
Mr Ettling who appeared on behalf of the taxpayer relied on Morley v Tatter sail.™ He argued 
that the fact that the moneys were not paid into a trust account does not alter the fact that they 
were held 'in trust' for customers. He drew the attention of the courts to a comment made by 
Atkinson J. He then said.51 
'as a matter of law, these moneys when received by (by Tattersall) were not the taxpayer's moneys at all; 
they belonged to their clients and if a client came in the next day and demanded his money they would 
have to pay it away.' 
Responding to Mr Ettling, Centlivres CJ went further and said: 
' . . . . [that] is not the position in the present case: here there was no obligation on the part of the 
appellant to pay a customer a sum equivalent to the deposit he had made when the customer tendered to 
it a usable drum... I can see no essential difference between the case of Brookes Lemos and the present 
case and in my opinion the appeal must be dismissed with costs.' 
The decision of this case confirmed the principle upheld in Brookes Lemos that for an amount 
to be excluded from a taxpayer's 'gross income' it must be received and held 'in trust in the 
stricto sensu of the word. 
49At 17 SATC 358. 
50108LJKB11. 
51At 17 SATC 358. 
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The critical issue is not how the money is accounted for in terms of accounting principles as it 
appears in the accounting records of the taxpayer. But if the taxpayer was entitled in terms of 
the law to deal with it as he pleased. 
The only transaction that would have saved the taxpayer was nothing less than a trust in the 
legal sense of the word or a pledge that could convince the court that the moneys received did 
not form part of the taxpayer's 'gross income'. 
There are also foreign cases dealing with an amount 'received by' or on behalf of the taxpayer 
and for his benefit. In Jay's Jewellers Ltd v IRC,52 the critical question was whether the 
surplus 'receipts' of the pawn broker's trade were profits assessable to tax. In summary it was 
held that the surpluses were trade receipts, not in the year when they arose, but in the year 
when they became the property of the taxpayer. This decision illustrates that the English 
income tax system attaches more weight to the proper accounting treatment of an amount 
received in advance. The opposite is true for the South African income tax system. That is 
why it was not important to delve into further details of this case because it would be less 
persuasive in South African courts. But none the less it is useful to compare different types of 
income tax systems. In South Africa the critical issue would be as follows: 
• When did the proceeds or surpluses become beneficially received by the taxpayer? 
• Did the change in the capacity in which the surpluses were held constitute a 'receipt' or 
an 'accrual' to him? 
But using the judgments from the Brookes and Greases cases where it was held that the 
moneys received by the taxpayer will not be included in its 'gross income' provided it acted 
as a trustee and created a trust in stricto sensu or was not legally entitled to the moneys 
received, the taxpayer in Jay's Jewellers Ltd would not be taxed on moneys received until 
they became its property. 
In ITC 134653 a controversial issue was raised that has not yet been resolved by the current 
income tax system. In fact it is one of many flaws of the South African income tax system. 
Unfortunately it affects a taxpayer more than it does the South African Revenue Service. 
[1947] 2 All ER 762, 29 TC 274. 
(1981)44SATC31. 
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An advance salary paid to an employee is included in his gross income in the year of receipt 
in terms of the definition of 'gross income' even if the amount may be repayable by him in 
future. The taxpayer was a pathologist who took sabbatical leave to do research for the period 
1 February 1977 to 31 January 1978. During this period he resigned from his post. In terms of 
his employment contract, the moneys received by him during this period in these 
circumstances had to be refunded. He was obliged to refund R6 930, being the six-month 
salary he had received while on leave. 
The critical issue in this case was to determine whether the remuneration that the taxpayer 
was obliged to refund to his employer had been 'received by' him and therefore formed part 
of his gross income. The representative of the taxpayer argued that in these circumstances the 
amount did not form part of his gross income because it was neither 'received by' nor 
'accrued to' him. It was held that the amounts received as an advance salary were 'received 
by' the taxpayer on his behalf and for his benefit to do with it as he pleased. 
Schock J, in arriving at his decision said,54 
' . . . . [i]n my judgment the appeal cannot succeed. During the year in question the taxpayer received the 
amount in question as his own and presumably used same for his own purpose.... The fact is that in the 
tax year in question he received the amount in question and retained it as his own. . . . the fact that in 
terms of the contract he may in certain circumstances, have to repay the same later, does not have the 
effect of excluding these amounts from his "gross income" for the year in which he received the same. 
'The results may seem anomalous but the position would be equally anomalous if the taxpayer was not 
liable for tax on the salary in the tax year in question.... 
'I see no escape from the conclusion that on the facts of this case the amount in question falls clearly 
within the taxpayer's "gross income" in the tax year in question.' 
On the facts the amount received by the taxpayer was 'beneficially received' by him and 
therefore formed part of his gross income. But if the amount had been lent to the taxpayer it 
would not have formed part of his gross income. The issue whether the taxpayer would be 
allowed a deduction was raised in the judgment, but was not answered. 
54At44SATC31. 
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In fact there is no provision in the Act that could allow the deduction of this expenditure. The 
anomaly is that the amount is included in the taxpayer's gross income in the year of receipt 
but when it is refunded back to the employer, it cannot be deductible under any provision of 
the Act. 
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Chapter 4 
Timing and valuation of receipts or accrual 
Silke55 is of the view that proper time of accrual of a non - cash item for example, assets, 
payments in kind, goods exchanged for other goods and foreign exchange is the time of 
accrual. This view was supported by the decisions in Mooi56 and Lace Proprietary Mines51 
Meyerowit58 provides a list of examples of the time of accrual. These are as follows: 
• Credit sales - there is an accrual when in terms of the contract the seller becomes entitled 
to payment, when the payment is to be made. 
• Cash sales - under a contract of a sale requiring cash against delivery, the Act deems the 
accrual to have taken place on the date of the agreement. 
• Hire purchase - when hire purchase contracts are entered into, the Act deems the accrual 
to take place on the date of the agreement. 
• Rental - when the lease is for a fixed period and cannot be determined before the 
conclusion of the period, the rental for the full period accrues in the year the lease is 
entered into. Because the lessor has performed his obligation to the lessee by giving him 
possession, the lessor's entitlement to the rental is unconditional. In practice, in a year of 
assessment, the rental is taxed only to the extent that it became due and payable, in that 
year, or in the ratio that the period of the lease concluded during the year bears to the total 
period of the lease. This practice is justifiable if it is accepted that the rental accrues on a 
day- to- day basis. 
• Dividends - a dividend accrues on the date of its declaration, or when the dividend is 
declared payable to shareholders registered on a particular date, then on that particular 
date. 
• Partnerships and joint ventures - the receipts and accruals of a joint venture or a 
partnership accrue to the individual partners at the same time as they accrue to the 
partnership. 
Silke Silke on South African Tax Foil 2007 para 217. 
1972 (1) SA675 (A), 34 SATC 1. 
1938 AD 267, 9 SATC 349. 
David Meyerowitz, S.C. Meyerowitz on Income Tax 2003-2004 para 6.19 to para 6.37 
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• Commissions - if the commission is paid at the conclusion of the contract, then the date 
of conclusion will be the accrual date. If the commission is paid after the delivery of 
goods ordered or upon payment by the debtor, the date of accrual will be the date of 
delivery or payment. 
• Option contracts - premiums accruing for an option contract are deemed to accrue on a 
day- to-day basis during the term of the contract. When, however, the option contract is 
exercised, terminated or disposed of, the unaccrued balance is deemed to have accrued on 
the date of its exercise, termination or disposal. 
• Unpaid accruals - once there has been an accrual the fact that the debtor is not in a 
position to pay or has not paid the debt does not affect the position as far as gross income 
is concerned. If the debt is doubtful or bad there is a provision for doubtful debts or bad 
debts written off. 
• Sale of a business with retrospective effect - if the business is sold with retrospective 
effect, for example, a contract of sale is entered into on 30 September, the purchaser to 
have the benefit of profits or assume the losses as from 1 July, while between the parties 
the contract is valid and effect must be given to it, the incidence of tax cannot be altered. 
All amounts accrued for the business up to the date of the contract of sale accrued to the 
vendor, and he (and not the purchaser), is liable for tax on them and is entitled to claim 
the resulting permissible deductions. 
• Sale of a business subject to a suspensive sale condition - if a business is sold subject to a 
precedent condition or a suspensive condition, for example, when a business is sold 
subject to the sale only becoming effective when transfer of licence has been effected, the 
taxing of the profits or loss in the interim period depends upon the terms of the contract. If 
the purchaser is put in possession of the business and the profits or losses are for his 
account, unless and until the condition is fulfilled, then the accruals are those of the 
vendor, even though in terms of the agreement the purchaser becomes entitled to the 
profits on fulfilment of the condition. 
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• Sale of a business subject to a resolutive condition for a example, - if a business is sold 
subject to a resolutive condition, for example, if payment of the purchase price is not 
made on due date then the sale will be cancelled, in this instance the sale is effective 
from the date the contract came into effect and the date of cancellation, if it is cancelled, 
will be, it is considered, those of the purchaser and not the vendor, even though as a result 
of the cancellation the purchaser must account for the receipts and accruals to the vendor. 
This is so because the purchaser cannot be regarded as a trustee or fiduciary for the 
receipts or accruals. The receipts and accruals are his absolute property. The fact that he 
may be obliged to account for them to the vendor upon the happening of a resolutive 
condition does not impress them with a trust. 
• Contract for the benefit of a third party - when there is a contract between two parties 
disposing of an asset or a business for the benefit of a third party {a stipulatio alteri) the 
tax position will be governed by the terms of the contract. If, for example, A contracts 
with B that the latter (B) sells his business to C, upon the condition that the sale becomes 
effective only when C accepts the benefits of the contract, the receipts and accruals, until 
C accepts, will be those of B. If, on the other hand, the sale is immediately effective, A 
being personally liable should C not accept, then the receipts and accruals are in the 
interim, it is considered, income subject to a trust, the taxation of which is governed by 
section 25B. 
In terms of the definition of 'gross income', only amounts 'received by' or 'accrued to' the 
taxpayer during a particular year of assessment are subject to tax in that year. Years of 
assessment are not linked to one another but each stands on its own. This is critical because 
tax rates and rebates change every year. So it is important that a receipt or accrual is taxed in 
the correct year of assessment. If amounts accrued and are received in a year of assessment it 
does not cause a problem. But a problem arises when there is an accrual that is not received 
before the end of the year of assessment. It is common cause that the gross income includes 
both 'receipts' and 'accruals' and that accruals are dealt with in terms of the accrual rule. 
The accrual rule provides that an amount to which a taxpayer is entitled, but that is payable 
only after the end of the year of assessment, accrues during the year of assessment when he 
became entitled to it, not the year of assessment when it is received. It therefore ends the long-
standing debate about the meaning of the word 'accrued'. In terms of this rule accrual is about 
'entitlement' not 'due and payable'. 
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The accrual rule is not only about timing but also deals with the amount of the accrual. Its 
objective is to include the full value of the accrual not payable at the last day of the year of 
assessment. In terms of the proviso to the definition of 'gross income',59 the rule has done 
away with the discounting of the accrual outstanding at the last day of the year of assessment. 
Taxpayers were allowed to include discounted values and submit their returns of income on 
this discounted basis on or before 23 May 1990. 
If the taxpayer after this date included in his gross income a discounted amount that was 
payable after last day of the year of assessment, and when in subsequent years the taxpayer 
finally received an amount, the untaxed difference or the discount of the accrual would be 
deemed to have accrued to the him during that subsequent year of assessment. The untaxed or 
discounted portion of the accrual is the difference between the original accrual to the taxpayer 
and the present value (or the discounted amount) that was included in his gross income in the 
year of accrual. 
The accrual principle has some shortfalls that have been highlighted in a number of judicial 
decisions. The accrual principle is contained in a proviso to the definition of 'gross income'. 
It reads as follows: 
'Provided that where during any year of assessment the taxpayer has become entitled to any amount 
which is payable on a date or dates falling after the last day of such year, there shall be deemed to have 
accrued to him during such year... such amount.' 
The above proviso deals with the taxpayer's entitlement at the end of year of assessment to an amount 
payable after year end. It uses the Lategan principle. It states that to become entitled to an amount means 
'to become entitled to claim payment' of that amount. An amount will always include both money and 
moneys' worth, but the proviso makes no reference to amounts expressed in money. 
Silke , suggests that the proviso refers to two different 'amounts', one of these amounts in specific 
terms and the other by implications. 
1 Section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 as amended. 
'Silke Silke on South African Income Tax Voll 2007 para 2.6. 
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The first is the 'amount' to which the taxpayer is entitled at the end of year of assessment. 
This amount cannot be valued otherwise the proviso will appear to be going against the 
Lategan principle. Since the proviso endorses or authorises the Lategan principle it means all 
outstanding amounts payable after the last day of year of assessment are valued at the end of 
year of assessment. This means that a settlement discount should be taken into account and 
that all amounts payable in the future must be discounted to their present values. 
It is assumed that the second amount is the 'amount' payable at the future date that is not 
specifically referred to. 
If this amount is expressed in money and is required to be valued at the date of payment, the 
value that will be included in gross income will be the face value of the 'amount' being the 
invoiced value. This interpretation would achieve the objective of the proviso in a normal 
income tax system. If the amount is moneys' worth, which is not uncommon, it means that the 
taxpayer must discount forward because he cannot discount backward to find a future value of 
the 'amount' to be included in gross income. 
Silke61 suggests that the error of logic made in the proviso is that it assumes that the 
alternative outcomes (presented as paragraphs (a) and (b)), being mutually exclusive actually 
constitute the full range of possible outcomes. It is further suggested that the legal meaning of 
the word 'amount' has been overlooked and this is the error of law. 
The proviso appears to allow recognition of outstanding settlement discounts when valuing 
outstanding accruals at the last day of the year of assessment. Even if the opposite was true it 
could be argued that an 'entitlement to claim payment' means an amount for which one can 
sue. If a supplier offers a settlement discount to a buyer at the last day of year of assessment, 
he can claim the full settlement of the full selling price. The agreement between the buyer and 
the seller is that on that day if the seller could claim his payment, it would be reduced by the 
settlement discount. 
Silke Silke on South African Income Tax Voll 2007 para2.7. 
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The Act also lays down methods for the determination of the date of accrual in other 
circumstances. These have been covered in the preceding paragraphs. Other provisions of the 
Act dealing with date of accrual are 
• section 8A, 
• section 241, 
• The Fourth Schedule, and 
• The Seventh Schedule. 
A number of cases have dealt with the timing of accrual. In ITC 148862 a taxpayer had 
resigned from both his employment and as a member of the pension fund. The critical issue in 
this case was the date of accrual of his resignation benefit from the pension fund. The fund 
provided for resignation benefits and other benefits. The fund used its discretionary powers to 
increase the benefits to the member. 
The taxpayer was awarded his resignation benefits from the fund. Because he was dissatisfied 
with those benefits he turned them down and applied for larger benefits. He did not succeed in 
his attempt. He ended up with his original benefits and interest. But he succeeded in his claim 
that the date of accrual of his benefits was not the date of their accrual but the date when his 
application in terms of the discretionary rule was decided. 
In ITC 155763 it was held that subsidies paid to bus operators by the Department of Transport 
on the basis of audited claims, accrue only when the claims were approved and paid by the 
Department, not when the ticket is sold. 
(1990) 53 SATC 56. 
(1992)55SATC218. 
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In South African Marine Corporation Ltd v CIR it was suggested that when an amount 
accrues to a taxpayer it must be valued on the date of the accrual. The taxpayer was a South 
African company carrying on the business of a ship-owner and operator. It operated cargo 
services between the South Africa and America. The taxpayer entered into a joint venture 
with an American company. On 18 September 1949 the South African currency, the pound, 
was devalued relative to the dollar. 
The taxpayer had an amount payable to it of $662 300 held by the American company on its 
behalf. The taxpayer recorded in its books all items adding up to this amount at the exchange 
rate that prevailed on the transaction date. When part of these moneys were paid over to the 
taxpayer, it received £60 920 more than the credit recorded in its books. The taxpayer treated 
this amount as an exchange profit in its books. The Commissioner included this profit in the 
'gross income' of the taxpayer and the amount was assessed to tax. 
The critical question that had to be answered by the court was, at what point during the year 
of assessment the accrual had to be valued? The court held that the accrual had to be valued at 
the date of accrual. In the present case, the date of accrual was the transaction date. In arriving 
at the judgment Ogilvie Thompson J said the following:65 
'It follows that appellant's trading operations as conducted by States Marine on its behalf - which 
operation I for convenience call appellant's American trading operations - attract Union tax: that is 
beyond dispute and is not questioned in this appeal. As, however, those operations are reflected in 
American dollars, and because for purposes of Union taxation appellant's accounts must be expressed in 
Union currency, it is necessary for appellant in its books to reflect its American trading operations in 
terms of Union points. In my opinion such conversion of dollars into South African pounds should be 
made at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date where under the items concerned - whether credit or 
debit - appear in the general account kept by the States Marine; for it is at such dates that (assuming 
States Marine's accounts to have been correctly kept) the accrual or receipt of income occurs.' 
Another view was adopted in Lategan 's case, when it was suggested that the value of an 
amount that has accrued to the taxpayer must be determined as at the last day of the year of 
assessment. In his judgment Watermeyer J said the following:66 
'1955 (1) SA654 (C), 20 SATC 15. 
i20SATC15At20. 
sAt2SATC16. 
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'Assuming that the right to receive the instalments was not converted into money by sale or otherwise 
during the year of assessment, the value to be fixed (apart from any question whether the debt was good 
or bad) would be the present value worth of the instalments at the end of the year.' 
This view was also proposed in Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR61 The issue in the present case was 
not the accrual or the receipt but whether the taxpayer was entitled to a deduction under 
section 11(a) for the debts payable by it to the two United Kingdom companies. 
Botha J in his judgment said that68 
' . . . [i]n determining the taxable income of a person carrying on any trade in any year of assessment 
there is, in terms of section 11(a), deductible from such person's income the expenditure actually 
incurred by him in the production of the income during that year of assessment.... It is at the end of that 
year of assessment that it is possible....' 
Therefore in summary with regards to the debt that the taxpayer had not discharged, the 
amount of the expenditure incurred during the year of assessment has to be brought into 
account at the end of that year of assessment unless the item was disposed of prior to that 
date. 
There are two conflicting views with regards to time of valuation. One view is that it is the 
date of accrual. The other view is that it is the last day of year of assessment. In Matla Coal69 
the Appellate Division revisited these two conflicting views but found it unnecessary to 
choose between them. 
1975(1)SA665(A). 
At 1 SATC 665. 
'1987 (1) SA 108 (A), 48 SATC 223. 
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In Mooi v SIR7" it was held that when the taxpayer acquired a conditional right, accrual could 
occur only on the date the condition was fulfilled. It was further suggested that for that right 
to be an accrual the 'amount' in question must have a monetary value. The taxpayer was an 
employee of a copper-mining company, namely, Palabora Mining Co. Ltd. On 25 July 1963 
the company granted the taxpayer an option to subscribe for 500 ordinary shares at Rl, 25 a 
share. The option had various conditions including the option was not exercisable until six 
months after the completion of the company's mining at Palabora and the option could be 
exercised only if the taxpayer was in the employment of the company. 
It was common cause that the option was granted to the taxpayer for services rendered so as to 
induce him to stay in the employment of the company. In October 1966 the taxpayer exercised 
his option by acquiring 500 ordinary shares at Rl, 25 each. The market value of the shares at 
the time when he exercised his option was R6, 40 a share. Therefore the total market value of 
the shares exceeded the option price by R5, 15 a share and in rand value terms a total amount 
of R2 575. 
This excess amount was included by the Commissioner in the gross income of the taxpayer 
for the 1967 year of assessment, the year when the option became exercisable. The taxpayer 
objected to this inclusion on the grounds that all that had accrued to him for services rendered 
or to be rendered was the right he acquired on 27 July 1963 to exercise an option at a later 
date when certain conditions have been fulfilled. 
The taxpayer argued further that when he exercised the option, the accrual was not for 
services rendered. It was held that what accrued to the taxpayer was the right, on the 
fulfilment of certain conditions, to obtain shares at a price of Rl, 25. The accrual took place 
only when the option to acquire shares became exercisable, that is on 1 September 1966. At 
that time the taxpayer was in the employment of the mining company. There was a causal 
relationship between the benefit he obtained in the form of an option and his service to the 
company. 
The benefit then fell within the definition of 'gross income.' 
In arriving at his conclusion Ogilvie Thompson CJ said the following:71 
1972 (1) SA675 (A), 34 SATC 1. 
At34SATCl. 
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'In order to determine the "amount" comprehended by this definition it is necessary, in the 
case of a right, to establish the value of that right.... In my opinion the right acquired by the 
appellant [the taxpayer] on 27 July 1963 lacked any inherent attribute of income and, but for 
the provision of paragraph (c) of the definition of "gross income", would appropriately be 
regarded as a right of a capital nature The object of paragraph (c) of the definition is of 
course to bring into the category of "gross income" all "amounts", whether of a capital nature 
or not accrued in respect of services. 
Linguistically inappropriate though the word "amount" may be in this context, when a 
taxpayer becomes entitled to a right in "in respect of services" a money value must be 
assigned to that right in order to determine the relevant "amount" to be incorporated as "gross 
income".... In my view the contingent right which appellant acquired on 27 July 1963 did no 
more than - to borrow a phrase used by Sellers LJ in the court of appeal in Abbots'" case . . . 
which said the benefit only accrued when the option became exercisable on 1 September 1966. 
The real benefit conferred upon appellant . . . was the right to apply for the shares at Rl,25 a 
share and that right arose when, upon fulfilment of the conditions of the option, the latter 
became exercisable. 
'On the facts, the measure of the aforementioned benefit - i.e. the "amount" to be incorporated 
in appellant's gross income - as at 1 September 1966 was R2 575.' This case does not only 
deal with the valuation of accrual but it also illustrates the principle of timing of the accrual and 
the casual link between the accrual and services rendered or to be rendered.' 
It is important to note the issue in Mooi 's case was dealt with under the definition of gross 
income then and not in terms of section 8A which was enacted years later. 
Broomberg72 briefly deals with timing of recognition of salary for income tax purposes as 
follows: 
'The so called Lategan rule is applied in practice to salaries and wages. The result is that an employee 
must include in his income all remuneration to which he has become entitled during the year of 
assessment, even though the amount may no be actually due and payable during the year.... One 
important exception to the Lategan rule is where the employee is entitled to leave pay. 
In this case the leave pay is deemed to accrue to the employee only on the date that it is paid to him or is 
due and payable to him (section 23E).' 
EB Broomberg & Des Kruger Tax Strategy 3rd Edition para 18.6. 
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He also deals with the factor of time when he states that 
'while no special timing of accrual rules apply to companies or trusts, the use of a company or trust may 
provide some opportunity for deferring the recognition of income in the sense that the income of a 
company or trust need not be distributed to the end beneficiaries, . . . immediately, thereby avoiding an 
accrual in their hands at that time'. 
The issue of 'timing and valuation of accrual' is still controversial because there are different 
views on the matter. Unfortunately the Act does not provide any clarity on the matter, 
especially on the valuation of an accrual. 
In Sacks v CIR1A it was held that the profits from a partnership or joint venture can be 
determined and accrue to individual partners only at the conclusion of the agreed period for 
the taking of account of the profits. For example, if two persons enter into a joint venture on 
1 January and agree that the profits are to be determined on 31 December, when the venture is 
to terminate, the profits will accrue to the individual partners only on that day. This was valid 
for a number of years until eventually the legislature decided to put an end to the state of 
affairs by introducing section 24H. It lays down special rules relating to the trade carried on 
by all partners. 
EB Broomberg & DesKruger Tax Strategy 3rd Edition para 2.9. 
'(1946) AD31, 13SATC43. 
'Received by' and 'accrued to' 50 
Chapter 5 
Non-monetary receipts and accruals (including barter transactions) 
The definition of 'gross income' includes cash or otherwise. This means that an amount of 
income in a non-monetary form must be included in gross income once its monetary value has 
been established. Every consideration received in terms of the definition of the 'gross income' 
must be valued because if it does not have a value it cannot be included in gross income. 
Meyerowitz75 provides practical situations as to how to determine the value of a consideration 
under different circumstances: 
For shares, their value will be their market value at the date of receipt or accrual whichever 
comes first. This principle was adopted in Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd 76 when it was 
suggested that the value of the consideration was R500 000. This value was arrived at by 
calculating the nominal value of each share by the number of shares allotted to the taxpayer 
(50 cents x 1 00 000). It was further held that the true intention of the parties to the 
transaction was that the taxpayer was to be paid in shares. Accordingly, it was assessed on the 
true value of shares. 
On the other hand, if the seller is entitled to claim a cash consideration and there is no 
obligation on him to use the purchase price to acquire shares, the cash consideration will be 
included in gross income, even if the seller on his own accord uses the purchase price to 
acquire shares in the purchasing company. 
So when an asset is sold, or services are rendered, and in return a cheque is received, SARS 
generally accepts that the cash amount stipulated in the agreement is the true consideration for 
the sale of goods or the remuneration for the services rendered. 
David Meyerowitz S.C. Meyerowitz on Income Tax 2003 and 2004 para 6.43 to 6.48. 
'(1938) AD 267,9 SATC349. 
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Once it has been confirmed that a receipt or accrual is in the form of shares, it is important to 
value the share to determine the amount to be included in gross income. The valuation will be 
on the basis of the Seventh Schedule if the shares pass from the employer to the employee. 
When the provisions of the Seventh Schedule do not apply that is, there is no employer-
employee relationship; the object is to establish the market value. 
There are many factors that must take into account when valuing shares in a private company. 
It is important to examine any indications that the shares are worth more than their break-up 
values. One indicator may be provided by the fact that the shares have recently changed hands 
at a particular price. That amount paid for shares may be a strong indicator of the value of 
those shares at that time of exchange. 
Another way of ascertaining the value of the shares received for goods or services rendered, is 
to enquire what price could have been obtained for them had some reasonable method of sales 
been adopted on that date.77 Although the market price of the shares on the given date is a 
relevant factor, it cannot be decisive because it might have been fictitious and momentary. 
The stability of the market quotation and its approximation to the value is properly tested to 
some extent by reference to the market quotation before and after that date. 
The practice of SARS78 is to adopt, as the value of the shares, the middle market price on the 
date of the agreement conferring the right on the recipient. If the shares are not quoted on the 
stock exchange, SARS is likely to take into account the prices of actual sales of the shares on 
or near the date of accrual, and the present or potential value of the shares as shown by the 
balance sheet of the company. 
SARS may value a share at its nominal value when there is insufficient information to value it 
on any other basis. 
096795 
Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v CIR 1938, AD 267, 9 SATC 349. 
Income Tax Practical Manual- Sevirce - 2004 
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Another amount received otherwise than in cash is when a barter or exchange transaction 
occurs. In a barter or exchange transaction goods are exchanged for other goods, or services 
are exchanged for other services. Gross income includes the value of every form of property 
received by or accrued to the taxpayer. So if an asset is exchanged or bartered for another 
asset, the value of the new asset constitutes an amount 'received or accrued'. 
If the old asset was not held as an asset of a capital nature, the value of the new asset 
constitutes gross income and it is taxable when it is received or accrues. The test is simple. 
Has an amount of income been received or accrued? 
So barter or exchange transactions are not excluded from the definition of 'gross income' as 
long as there is proof that the old asset that has been exchanged formed part of the trading 
stock, and that the asset received in exchange constitutes an amount 'received by' or 'accrued 
to' with a money value. No further inquiry need be made, for example, whether or not the 
transaction would be regarded as a realisation by a prudent businessman or in terms of strict 
accountancy procedures. In terms of the Act, if a trading asset is bartered or exchanged for a 
new asset whether or not the two are similar, the value of the new asset constitutes 'gross 
income', the mode of realisation is not relevant. 
In a barter transaction on income account, an asset received might be worth more when it is 
actually received either in the same year of assessment or in the year of assessment following 
that in which the right to acquire it accrued. The excess amount will be included in gross 
income and be assessable to tax. 
Notwithstanding the principle stated above, section 24A of the Act provides an alternative 
assessment of transactions dealing with exchange or barter of trading stock made up of fixed 
property (for example, land and buildings) or shares in any company for a consideration 
consisting of shares in a public company, quoted by a recognised stock exchange, for 
example, the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE), or to be quoted within six months of 
the transaction, or other shares when there is a consolidation or merger of the interests of two 
or more persons. 
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The Commissioner and the taxpayer may agree if the situation arises that the consideration 
will be excluded from taxpayer's gross income for the year of assessment when the shares are 
received by or accrues to the taxpayer and be taxed only when the shares are disposed of. 
Section 24A will not operate automatically but will apply when the taxpayer takes the 
initiative and requests its application. It is unlikely that the Commissioner will take the 
initiative to apply this provision. 
Again it is important to note that the Commissioner will not agree to the application of the 
provision if he is of the opinion that the taxation of paper profits arising from transactions of 
this nature will not cause any hardship to the taxpayer in the year of accrual. 
Broomberg19 discusses the tax complications of a barter or exchange or 'payments in kind 
transactions'. He looks at the seller's position when he receives an asset in exchange for 
trading stock disposed of by him. Broomberg seems to support the principle as set out above, 
that the seller will include in gross income the value of the asset acquired by him. The value 
of the asset must be determined at the time the seller acquired the right to the asset. If the 
asset does not have a value or cannot be converted into money it will not be included in the 
gross income of the seller. This is the principle that was upheld in Butcher Bros.*0 
Statement AC 111 treats barters or exchange transactions slightly differently. It concentrates 
on the nature of both assets that have exchanged hands rather than concentrating on the asset 
received as does the Act. But as previously stated the Act is not based on accounting 
principles with the exception of a few provisions of the Act. Listed below are principles 
dealing with barter transactions as laid down in Statement AC 111: 
• When goods or services are exchanged for goods or services of a similar nature and 
value, then no revenue arises from that transaction as, in substance, inventory has 
been swapped for inventory and no sale has occurred. 
• When goods or services of a dissimilar nature are exchanged, then the substance of 
the transaction is a sale of one good or service and the purchase of another. 
EB Broomberg & Des Kruger Tax Strategy 3rd Edition para 5.1. 
'1945 AD 301, 13 SATC 21. 
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Statement AC 431 clarifies by way of an example the accounting for revenue arising from 
barter transactions involving dissimilar advertising services, with reference to non-barter 
transactions of the seller. 
When the value of the consideration is the right to acquire shares at par, or at another price, 
the value of the consideration will be the difference between the value of the shares and the 
purchase price. 
When a taxpayer is given a right or option to take up shares, the question that is always asked 
is what must be valued for the gross income inclusion? Is it the value of the right or option at 
the date that it is granted, or is it the benefit when the right or option is exercised? The right 
or option to take up shares is valued at the date of accrual not when the option or right is 
exercised. But for directors and employees the opposite is true. For directors and employees 
the right or option to take up shares is valued at the time the option or right is exercised, 
released, ceded or disposed of. If, however, the gain is made by way of exercise and there is a 
condition imposed by the grantor or employer of the option then the employee can elect not to 
include the gain in his gross income until the condition is fulfilled. This is the method of 
taxation used in section 8A of the Act. The provisions of section 8B or section 8C could apply 
to share options that arise on or after 26 October 2004. 
When the consideration is the right to the use of a property be it land or building or money, 
the value of the consideration will be moneys worth. For example for the use of property the 
value will be the rental that could be chargeable in an arms' length transaction or for an 
interest-free loan the ruling interest rate. 
For most considerations given by an employer to an employee the value of the consideration 
is determined in terms of the Seventh Schedule to the Act. 
In CIR v Butcher Bros (Pty) Ltdtx it was suggested that a lease premium is a consideration 
passing from a lessee to a lessor, whether in cash or otherwise, distinct from and in addition 
to, or in lieu of, rental and it must have a considerable money value. 
1945 AD 301, 13 SATC 21. 
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The taxpayer acquired land, under a lease over a fifty-year period. The lessee in terms of the 
lease was obliged to erect and maintain buildings on the leased premises to the value of 
£55 000. At the end of the lease, the buildings would become the property of the lessor 
without any compensation to the lessee. The lessee demolished the existing building on the 
leased premises, and erected new buildings. They were completed in 1955. The Commissioner 
included the £55 000 in the gross income of the taxpayer for its 1935 year of assessment on 
the basis that, when completed, the buildings were a premium or like consideration in terms of 
the Act. 
It was held that the advantages accruing to the taxpayer were not capable of being valued in 
1935, and were therefore, not an amount. No amount had therefore been received by or had 
accrued to the taxpayer in its 1935 year of assessment. 
In arriving at his conclusion Feetham JA said the following:82 
'I have already said, at the following interpretation of the expression "premium or like consideration" as 
used in paragraph (d) in so far as it refers to relations between lessor and lessee: 
'Consideration passing from a lessee to lessor, whether in cash or otherwise, distinct from and 
in addition to or in lieu of, rent. 
'I think, however, we must infer that "like consideration" referred to in paragraph (d) must 
have an ascertainable money value, and not a merely conjectural value; otherwise it could not, I 
think, be said to possess the necessary resemblance to a premium ... . In order to give effect to 
this view I would insert "having an ascertainable money value" after the word 
"consideration", where it occurs in the above suggested definition. But if, as I think the word 
"amount", as used in paragraph (d), must also mean an amount have ascertainable money 
value...' 
When this case was decided, the Act did not contain a provision like the current paragraph (h) 
of the definition of 'gross income'. The case was therefore argued on the basis of whether the 
lessor's right to have improvements effected on the leased premises was a 'lease premium'. 
The court then refused to accept the assessment because according to it no amount had been 
shown to have accrued to the taxpayer in the year of assessment in question. 
AU3SATC21 
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The court having considered the duration of the lease agreement, the nature of the building 
erected (a theatre) and the uncertainty as to what the value of the improvements would be at 
the end of the lease, found it impossible to value the 'amount' that had accrued to the taxpayer 
at the commencement of the lease. 
Paragraph (h) of the definition of 'gross income' was enacted as a direct result of the decision 
in Butcher Bros. The problem of valuation encountered in this case has been overcome by the 
formula laid down in that paragraph. The relevance of this case lies in its general decision: 
• First, that a lease premium is 'consideration passing from a lessee to a lessor, whether 
in cash or otherwise, distinct from and in addition to, or in lieu of, rent'. 
• Secondly, that the word 'amount' means an amount having 'an ascertainable money 
value'. 
• Thirdly, those undertakings that are normal incidents of leases, such as those which 
require a lessee to pay rates and taxes or to maintain buildings in good repair, do not 
constitute a lease premium. 
It has been argued that the Butcher Bros's decision confirms that the onus of proof which is 
normally on the taxpayer only comes into operation after Commissioner has proved that there 
is an 'amount' that has accrued to the taxpayer. So the onus is on the Commissioner to prove 
that what has accrued to the taxpayer is an 'amount.' In Butcher Bros the Commissioner failed 
to have his assessment upheld because he could not prove that what had accrued to the 
taxpayer was an 'amount' that had an ascertainable money value. In conclusion Butcher 
Brothers suggests that if the accrual has no value it is not to be regarded as income. 
Gross income is the total amount received by or accrued to the taxpayer whether in cash or 
otherwise. Even if the terms 'whether in cash or otherwise' was not in the definition, the 
definition would include, by virtue of the term 'amount', not only money, but the value of any 
corporeal or incorporeal property earned by the taxpayer that has a money value. Income tax 
is levied on all receipts or accruals with an ascertainable value. 
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If the accrual or receipt is not in money's worth, or cannot be converted into money, it cannot 
be regarded as income. This principle was upheld in Butcher Bros. Therefore if a person 
renders services or sells goods in return for shares, he will have to include in his gross income 
the value of shares. The value to be placed on non-monetary receipts or accrual is the amount 
that can be obtained for it on the open market if it was sold in an arms' length transaction 
between a willing buyer and seller. 
But this is a general rule which is modified by paragraph (/') of 'gross income' in section 1 
read with the Seventh Schedule. It taxes fringe benefits given to an employee by an employer. 
The general rule for the valuation of assets other than cash received by the taxpayer must take 
precedence over any arbitrary or near-arbitrary formula of valuation adopted by SARS in 
practice. A typical example is the valuation of an insurance policy ceded to a taxpayer for 
services rendered or to be rendered. 
Even if the formula is convenient, it is the true market value that is relevant, and if the 
taxpayer can prove that the market value is a particular amount, it is that amount that must be 
included in his gross income. Similarly, the surrender value of an insurance policy as 
determined by the insurer need not necessarily be the correct amount to be included in 
employee's gross income. 
SilkeS3 is of the view that the practice of SARS for the valuation of an insurance policy ceded 
to an employee or former employee emerges from an agreement reached between the 
Commissioner and the Life Offices Association. This agreement was directed at eliminating 
the avoidance of tax under a deferred compensation scheme. 
The practice applies when either paragraph (d) or (m) of the definition of 'gross income' 
requires the value of an insurance policy ceded by an employer to an employee to be 
established. The value is arrived at by taking the difference between the present values of all 
expected future benefits less the present value of all future incomes. If an employee pays or 
has paid any consideration, those considerations will be deducted to arrive at the value. The 
present value according to Silke is calculated according to the actuarial table entitled Ultimate 
Mortality of SA 56-62 at 11%. 
Silke Silke on South African Taxes Vol 2007 para 2.13. 
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As pointed out above the principle that if the thing received by or accruing to the taxpayer 
cannot be turned into money, it cannot be subjected to tax. For example, the benefits enjoyed 
by a borrower of an interest-free loan or that derived by a taxpayer enjoying the free use of a 
house or other asset in terms of a will, are not taxable. But when an employer and employees 
are the parties to the transaction, the benefit will taxed in terms of the Seventh Schedule. 
The issue of non-monetary receipts was also dealt with in Stander v CIR..U The taxpayer was 
chosen as one of the top five bookkeepers of a particular franchise dealer. In recognition of 
achieving excellent standards performance in financial management, the taxpayer was 
awarded a prize consisting of an overseas trip that cost the franchise dealer R14 000. The 
Commissioner included R14 000 in the gross income of the taxpayer and it was assessed to 
tax. The taxpayer appealed against the inclusion of this amount in his gross income. The court 
held if the amount was to be taxed it would be included in gross income in terms of 
paragraph (c) of the definition of'gross income'. 
For paragraph (c) of the definition of 'gross income' to apply the taxpayer must have received 
an amount. It could include a 'voluntary' award. This amount would have to be for services 
rendered or by virtue of any employment or holding of any office. It was held that having 
gone on the trip; the taxpayer had not received any property on which a monetary value could 
be placed in his hands. It did not constitute a right that could be turned into money. It was also 
held because of 'that' particular conditions applicable to the enjoyment of this award, the said 
trip had no value in the taxpayer's hands to bring it within the terms of paragraph (c) of the 
definition of'gross income'. 
For the reasons stated above it was held that the trip in question did not give rise to an amount 
and was therefore not to be subjected to tax. It should not have been included by the 
Commissioner as part of the taxpayer's gross income. 
1997 (3) 59 SA617 SATC 212. 
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Conclusion 
The definition of 'gross income' gives rise to a number of problems. This is supported by the 
fact that there are a number of cases dealing with this definition. In addition almost every 
critical component of the definition is either vague or has no clear meaning as to what it 
intends. For ease of reference these components are 
• the total amount, 
• in cash or otherwise, 
• received by, or accrued to, or in favour of a person, 
• excluding receipts and accruals of a capital nature. 
There are no definitions to provide clarity on the above components of the definition of'gross 
income'. Instead these components are given their common meaning obtained from judicial 
decisions. Because the definition of'gross income' is itself set out in section 1 of the Act and 
because many of its terms are not defined, makes it difficult to understand what it means. It is 
difficult to conceptualise why the legislature has for so long ignored these deficiencies in the 
definition of 'gross income'. It is the corner stone to income tax. Is it because SARS has the 
financial resources contributed by complying taxpayers that it is able to go to court every time 
there is an issue around the definition of'gross income'. If something (of a revenue nature) is 
not gross income with the exception of certain special provisions, it cannot be taxed in terms 
of the Act. In a perfect world the legislature should make sure that this, being the most 
important definition of the Act, contains no deficiencies. It should not be vague and when 
there is ambiguity, proper interpretation notes should be made available. 
The courts have come to the rescue of both the taxpayers and the Commissioner by providing 
meanings to certain words and terms. These meanings are used in determining whether an 
amount constitute gross income. In conclusion a summary of these interpretations follows: 
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Total amount 
• There must be an amount received by or accrued to a person before it can be included 
in gross income. This includes not only money but also the value of every form of 
property earned by a person. When an asset is exchanged or bartered, the value of the 
asset acquired constitutes an amount received or accrued and must have monetary 
value or be convertible in to money. 
• For non-monetary receipts the value of the asset must be determined objectively. 
• If a receipt or accrual has no ascertainable value, it cannot be included in gross 
income. 
Cash or otherwise 
• The term 'cash or otherwise' includes anything that has an ascertainable value or a 
monetary worth. It includes any the 'cash equivalent of the value' of any benefits 
received by an employee from an employer. 
Received by or accrued to 
• An amount is received only if it is received by a person on his own behalf and for his 
own benefit. 
• Certain amounts may be deemed to have been received by a person even though they 
have neither been received by nor accrued to a person, for example, business income 
in a partnership or investment income that is shared equally between spouses if they 
are married in community of property. 
Accrued means to become entitled to something 
• It also means become unconditionally entitled to something, 
• It is important to note that a person is still taxed on an amount even if this amount is 
donated or disposed of immediately after its receipt or accrual. 
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The above interpretations adopted by the courts are of assistance while the legislature 
continues not to redefine or revamp the definition of 'gross income'. It is important to add that 
these decisions lack economic or accounting principles. The courts have failed in their 
decisions to identify underlying concepts. Instead they have adopted a narrow and literal 
meaning when interpreting provisions of the Act. A typical example, without going into 
details because it has been dealt with in one of the chapters above, is the issue of barter 
transactions. An accounting approach is to analyse the nature of the transaction before 
deciding on the value of the receipt or accrual. The tax system including judicial decisions 
focus on the asset acquired in a barter transaction, without taking into account issues like 
similarity or dissimilarity of the assets being exchanged. But again it is understood that the tax 
system with the exception of a few provisions is not based on any accounting or economic 
principles. 
The advantage about accounting or economic principles is that they have clear guidelines of 
how, what, and when to account or not to account for something. Furthermore the accounting 
standards are currently being harmonised to be in line with international standards. Maybe it 
is time for the courts and the tax system to move in this direction. It may take a long time but 
it will bring into rest the confusion brought about by aspects of the Act not properly defined 
by the current system. 
'Received by' and 'accrued to' 62 
Bibliography 
Books 
David Meyerowitz: Meyerowitz on Income Tax 2003-2004 
D Kruger, W Scholtz EB Broomberg: Tax Strategy 4th Edition-2003 
EB Broomberg & Des Kruger: Tax Strategy 3rd Edition-1998 
Ettiene Retief & Antonie Goosen: Practical Handbook for SMMES-2004 
Lexis Nexis Butterworths: Professional Tax Handbook 2003-2004 13th Edition 
Lexis Nexis Butterworths: Income Tax Practical Manual-2004 
Lexis Nexis Butterworths: Income Tax Practical Manual-Service, Issue 15 
M Wells and L Stainbank: Illustrated South African Financial Reporting 3rd Edition-2002 
RC Williams: Income Tax in South Africa: Cases and Materials Edition-2004 
Silke: Silke on South African Income Tax-2007 
SAICA Handbook Accounting Volume IB - 2003/2004 
SAICA Handbook Accounting Volume 1A - 2003/2004 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 as amended 
Margot Report: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of 
South Africa (The Margo Commission Report), 1987 
'Received by' and 'accrued to' 63 
TABLE OF CASES 
1. Brookes Lemos v CIR 1947 (2) SA 976 (A), 14 SATC 295 
2. Building Contractors v COT 1941 SR 233,12 SATC 182 
3. C: SARS v Cape Consumers (Pty) Ltd 1994 (4) SA 1213 (C), 61 SATC91. 
4. Caltex Oil (SA) Limited v SIR 1975 (1) SA 665 (A) 
5. CIR v Butcher Bros 1945 AD 301, 13 SATC 21 
6. CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242; 6 SATC 92 
7. CIR v Germ & Co. (Pty) Ltd 1955 (3) SA 293 (A) , 20 SATC 113 
8. CIR v Lunnon 1924 AD 94, 1 SATC 7 
9. CIR v Witwaterand Association of Racing Clubs, 1960 (3) SA 291 (A), 23 SATC 380 
10. COT v G 1981 (4) SA 167 (ZA), 43 SATC 159 
11. Geldenhys v CIR 1974 (3) SA 256 (C), 14 SATC 419 
12. Greases (SA) Ltd v CIR 1951 (3) SA 518 (A), 17 SATC 358 
13. Hersov v CIR 1952 (1) SA 485 (A), 18 SATC 20 
14. Hersov's Estate 1957 (1) SA 471 (A), 21 SATC 106 
15. Hiddingh v CIR 1941 AD 111, 11 SATC 205 
16. Jay's The Jewllers Ltd v IRC [1947] 2 All ER 762, 29TC 274 
17. Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v CIR 1938 AD 267, 9 SATC 349 
18. Lategan v CIR 1926 CPD 203, 2 SATC 16 
19. Matla Coal Ltd v CIR 1987 (1) SA 108 (A), 48 SATC 223 
20. CIR, TRANSKEI, and another v Moodie and another 1993 (2) SA 501 (TkAD), 55 
SATC 164 
21. Mooi v SIR 1972 (1) SA 675 (A), 34 SATC 1 
22. Morley v Tattersall 108 LJ KB 11 
23. Ochberg v CIR 1933 CPD 256, 6 SATC1 
24. People's Store (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd, v CIR 1990 (2) SA 353 (A), 52 SATC 9 
25. Pyotts Ltd v CIR 1945 AD 128, 13 SATC 121 
26. Sacks v CIR 1946 AD 31, 13 SATC 43 
'Received by' and 'accrued to' 
27. Rishworth v SIR 1964 (4) SA 493 (A), 26 SATC 275 
28. Scott v FCT (1966) 117 CLR 514 (High Court of Australia) 
29. South African Marine Corporation Ltd v CIR 1955 (1) SA 654 (C), 20 SATC15 
30. Stander v CIR 1997 (3) SA 617 (C) , 59 SATC 212 
31. ITC 1346 (1981) 44 SATC 31 
32. ITC 1405 (1990) 49 SATC 6 
33. ITC 1415 (1986) 48 SATC 179 
34. ITC 521 (1942) 12 SATC 408 
35. ITC 675 (1949) 16 SATC 238 
36. ITC 525 (1942) 12 SATC 424 
37. ITC702 (1950) 17 SATC 145 
38. ITC 1634 (1997) 60 SATC 235 
39. ITC 1415 (1936) 48 SATC 179 
40. ITC 265 (1932) 7 SATC 149 
41. ITC 1624 (1996) 59 SATC 373 
42. ITC 707 (1950) 17 SATC 224 
43. ITC 1488 (1990) 53 SATC 56 
44. ITC 1557 (1992) 55 SATC 218 
'Received by' and 'accrued to' 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 2 
HYPOTHESES 3 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 4 
CHAPTER 1 4 
INTRODUCTION 4 
CHAPTER 2 6 
MEANING OF 'ACCRUED TO ' 6 
CHAPTER 3 21 
MEANING OF'RECEIVED BY'THE TAXPAYER AND'BENEFICIAL RECEIPT' 21 
CHAPTER 4 39 
TIMING AND VALUATION OF RECEIPTS OR ACCRUAL 39 
CHAPTER 5 50 
NON-MONETARY RECEIPTS AND ACCRUALS (INCLUDING BARTER TRANSACTIONS) 50 
CONCLUSION 59 
TOTAL AMOUNT 6 0 
CASH OR OTHERWISE 6 0 
RECEIVED BY OR ACCRUED TO 60 
ACCRUED MEANS TO BECOME ENTITLED TO SOMETHING 6 0 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 62 
BOOKS 62 
TABLE OF CASES 63 
TABLE OF SECTIONS 65 
TABLE OF REFERENCE 67 
'Received by' and 'accrued to' 66 
TABLE OF OTHER REFERENCES 
GAAP 18,24 
AC111 18,54 
AC130 19,24 
AC431 55 
